On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 04:58:47PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:

On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 07:52, Jarkko Sakkinen
[off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:48PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:

quoted

Add MAINTAINERS entry for TEE based Trusted Keys framework.

Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <redacted>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <redacted>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 48aff80..eb3d889 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS

@@ -9663,6 +9663,14 @@ F:     include/keys/trusted-type.h
 F:   include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
 F:   security/keys/trusted-keys/

+KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE
+M:   Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
+L:   linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
+L:   keyrings@vger.kernel.org
+S:   Supported
+F:   include/keys/trusted_tee.h
+F:   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
+
 KEYS/KEYRINGS
 M:   David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 M:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
--

2.7.4

I'm sorry but I think I have changed my mind on this. This has been
spinning for a while and sometimes conclusions change over the time.

I don't think that we really need a separate subsystem tag.

I don't see it as a separate subsystem but rather a kind of underlying
trust source (TEE) driver plugged into existing trusted keys
subsystem. We could relate it to the RNG subsystem as well where there
is a subsystem maintainer and specific driver maintainers.

IMO, having a dedicated entry like this brings clarity in maintenance
and in future we may have more trust sources like this added where
everyone may not have access to all the trust sources to test.

More entries pointing to the exact same stuff does not necessarily mean
clarity in my books.

quoted

I'd be for a
new M-entry or R-entry to the existing subsystem tag. It's essential to
have ack from someone with ARM and TEE knowledge but this way too heavy
for the purpose.

If you still think otherwise then I am fine with a new M-entry for
existing trusted keys subsystem as well.

Adding a M-entry does makes sense because trusted keys backends can be
based on various technologies and standard. It's a different in that
sense than lets say a TPM hardware driver.

quoted

I also see it the most manageable if the trusted keys PR's come from a
single source.

I echo here with you to have a single source for trusted keys PR's
irrespective of whether we go with a separate trust source entry or
update existing subsystem entry.

-Sumit

And I echo that oviously if there is someone to say the final ack about
TEE, I will require that as the minimum to ever pick any of those
changes :-)

I would resolve this with just the M-entry, and we can *later on*
restructure, if there is a need for that. These things are not sealed
to stone.

/Jarkko

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