Hi!
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Thanks for the lively discussion. I have tried to answer some of the
comments below.
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There are options today, e.g.
a) If the restriction is only per-alias, you can have distinct aliases
where one is writable and another is executable, and you can make it
hard to find the relationship between the two.
b) If the restriction is only temporal, you can write instructions into
an RW- buffer, transition the buffer to R--, verify the buffer
contents, then transition it to --X.
c) You can have two processes A and B where A generates instrucitons into
a buffer that (only) B can execute (where B may be restricted from
making syscalls like write, mprotect, etc).
The general principle of the mitigation is W^X. I would argue that
the above options are violations of the W^X principle. If they are
allowed today, they must be fixed. And they will be. So, we cannot
rely on them.
Would you mind describing your threat model?
Because I believe you are using model different from everyone else.
In particular, I don't believe b) is a problem or should be fixed.
It is a problem because a kernel that implements W^X properly
will not allow it. It has no idea what has been done in userland.
It has no idea that the user has checked and verified the buffer
contents after transitioning the page to R--.
No, it is not a problem. W^X is designed to protect from attackers
doing buffer overflows, not attackers doing arbitrary syscalls.
Best regards,
Pavel
--
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