[PATCH ARM32 v4.4 V2 34/47] ARM: 8795/1: spectre-v1.1: use put_user() for __put_user()
From: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Date: 2019-08-01 08:21:06
Also in:
stable
Subsystem:
arm port, the rest · Maintainers:
Russell King, Linus Torvalds
From: Julien Thierry <redacted> Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream. When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make __put_user() an alias of put_user(). Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <redacted> Signed-off-by: Russell King <redacted> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> --- arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 94b1bf53b820..7f96a942d9a0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h@@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ do { \ __pu_err; \ }) +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE +/* + * When mitigating Spectre variant 1.1, all accessors need to include + * verification of the address space. + */ +#define __put_user(x, ptr) put_user(x, ptr) + +#else #define __put_user(x, ptr) \ ({ \ long __pu_err = 0; \
@@ -414,12 +422,6 @@ do { \ __pu_err; \ }) -#define __put_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ -({ \ - __put_user_switch((x), (ptr), (err), __put_user_nocheck); \ - (void) 0; \ -}) - #define __put_user_nocheck(x, __pu_ptr, __err, __size) \ do { \ unsigned long __pu_addr = (unsigned long)__pu_ptr; \
@@ -499,6 +501,7 @@ do { \ : "r" (x), "i" (-EFAULT) \ : "cc") +#endif /* !CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE */ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern unsigned long __must_check
--
2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b
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