[PATCH v5 07/17] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
From: Dave.Martin@arm.com (Dave Martin)
Date: 2018-11-15 10:25:47
Also in:
kvmarm, linux-arch, lkml
On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 06:11:39PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote: [...]
On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 12:24:04PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
[...]
quoted
FWIW: I think we should be entertaining a prctl() interface to use a new key on a per-thread basis. Obviously, this would need to be used with care (e.g. you'd fork(); use the prctl() and then you'd better not return from the calling function!). Assuming we want this (Kees -- I was under the impression that everything in Android would end up with the same key otherwise?), then the question is do we want: - prctl() get/set operations for the key, or - prctl() set_random_key operation, or - both of the above? Part of the answer to that may lie in the requirements of CRIU, where I strongly suspect they need explicit get/set operations, although these could be gated on CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y.I managed to speak to the CRIU developers at LPC. The good news is that their preference is for a ptrace()-based interface for getting and setting the keys, so the only prctl() operation we need is to set a random key (separately for A and B).
That's good if it works for them, and it seems the cleaner approach. _If_ they run the new thread up to a checkpoint, restoring the memory and doing all the setup that requires in-thread syscalls, then stop it in ptrace to finally inject the regs, then it makes sense to set the keys at that stop -- i.e., you set the keys atomically* with the final setting of the thread's PC. (* with respect to the target thread) So long as you're confident they've understood the implications of ptrauth for CRIU, I guess this can work. (In other news, they will also need to do some work to support SVE, but that's unrelated to ptrauth.) Cheers ---Dave