Thread (18 messages) flat view 18 messages, 3 authors, 2018-09-24

[PATCH RESEND 3/6] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1

From: Will Deacon <hidden>
Date: 2018-09-18 17:15:35
Also in: lkml

On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 11:52:27AM +0200, Robert Richter wrote:
On 18.09.18 09:38:05, Will Deacon wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 07:22:07PM +0200, Robert Richter wrote:
quoted
On 27.08.18 16:33:07, Mian Yousaf Kaukab wrote:
quoted
Hard-coded since patches are merged and there are no configuration
options.
Could you add a list of upstream patches to the description that are
required to solve this? This would be a strict definition for the
mitigation being enabled and makes it easier to check if backports are
affected or not. A build-time check would be ideal (e.g. checking for
certain macros).
Hmm, I don't grok what you're proposing here. Why do we need a build-time
check (and to check what?)
My concern is, that for kernel backports (esp. distro kernels) there
could be various interpretations of what "Mitigation: __user pointer
sanitization" means. So a list of upstream patches that need to be
backported in addition to this patch as a requirement would be good to
agree on. That should be documented in the patch description.

If these mitigations are available in a kernel backport, that could be
even checked at build time. E.g. we could have a sanity check if the
macro array_index_nospec() is defined. But such a check does not
replace a code review of a kernel backport.

I hope that makes sense?
Ok, I see what you mean now, thanks. However, it doesn't sound much
different than backporting a patch with dependencies, so I'd rather
avoid adding additional code to treat this case specially.

Will
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help