[PATCH 2/2] crypto: skcipher: Remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2018-09-06 00:43:55
Also in:
linux-crypto, lkml
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 3:49 PM, Ard Biesheuvel [off-list ref] wrote:
On 5 September 2018 at 23:05, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 2:18 AM, Ard Biesheuvel [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 4 September 2018 at 20:16, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this caps the skcipher request size similar to other limits and adds a sanity check at registration. Looking at instrumented tcrypt output, the largest is for lrw: crypt: testing lrw(aes) crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize: 8 crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize: 88 crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize: 472Are you sure this is a representative sampling? I haven't double checked myself, but we have plenty of drivers for peripherals in drivers/crypto that implement block ciphers, and they would not turn up in tcrypt unless you are running on a platform that provides the hardware in question.Hrm, excellent point. Looking at this again: The core part of the VLA is using this in the ON_STACK macro: static inline unsigned int crypto_skcipher_reqsize(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { return tfm->reqsize; } I don't find any struct crypto_skcipher .reqsize static initializers, and the initial reqsize is here: static int crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) { ... skcipher->reqsize = crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(ablkcipher) + sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request); with updates via crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(). So I have to examine ablkcipher reqsize too: static inline unsigned int crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize( struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm) { return crypto_ablkcipher_crt(tfm)->reqsize; } And of the crt_ablkcipher.reqsize assignments/initializers, I found: ablkcipher reqsize: 1 struct dcp_aes_req_ctx 8 struct atmel_tdes_reqctx 8 struct cryptd_blkcipher_request_ctx 8 struct mtk_aes_reqctx 8 struct omap_des_reqctx 8 struct s5p_aes_reqctx 8 struct sahara_aes_reqctx 8 struct stm32_cryp_reqctx 8 struct stm32_cryp_reqctx 16 struct ablk_ctx 24 struct atmel_aes_reqctx 48 struct omap_aes_reqctx 48 struct omap_aes_reqctx 48 struct qat_crypto_request 56 struct artpec6_crypto_request_context 64 struct chcr_blkcipher_req_ctx 80 struct spacc_req 80 struct virtio_crypto_sym_request 136 struct qce_cipher_reqctx 168 struct n2_request_context 328 struct ccp_des3_req_ctx 400 struct ccp_aes_req_ctx 536 struct hifn_request_context 992 struct cvm_req_ctx 2456 struct iproc_reqctx_s The base ablkcipher wrapper is: 80 struct ablkcipher_request And in my earlier skcipher wrapper analysis, lrw was the largest skcipher wrapper: 384 struct rctx iproc_reqctx_s is an extreme outlier, with cvm_req_ctx at a bit less than half. Making this a 2920 byte fixed array doesn't seem sensible at all (though that's what's already possible to use with existing SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK users). What's the right path forward here?The skcipher implementations based on crypto IP blocks are typically asynchronous, and I wouldn't be surprised if a fair number of SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() users are limited to synchronous skciphers.
Looks similar to ahash vs shash. :) Yes, so nearly all
crypto_alloc_skcipher() users explicitly mask away ASYNC. What's left
appears to be:
crypto/drbg.c: sk_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(ctr_name, 0, 0);
crypto/tcrypt.c: tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(algo, 0, async ? 0
: CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
drivers/crypto/omap-aes.c: ctx->ctr =
crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] =
crypto_alloc_skcipher(ciphermode, 0, 0);
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c: ic->journal_crypt =
crypto_alloc_skcipher(ic->journal_crypt_alg.alg_string, 0, 0);
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c: struct crypto_skcipher *tfm =
crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c: ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c: crypt_stat->tfm =
crypto_alloc_skcipher(full_alg_name, 0, 0);
I'll cross-reference this with SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK...
So we could formalize this and limit SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() to synchronous skciphers, which implies that the reqsize limit only has to apply synchronous skciphers as well. But before we can do this, we have to identify the remaining occurrences that allow asynchronous skciphers to be used, and replace them with heap allocations.
Sounds good; thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security