[PATCH 06/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches
From: Vladimir Murzin <hidden>
Date: 2018-05-16 11:33:54
Also in:
kvmarm
On 16/05/18 12:01, Russell King wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
__v7_cr7mp_proc_info: .long 0x410fc170 .long 0xff0ffff0 - __v7_proc __v7_cr7mp_proc_info, __v7_cr7mp_setup + __v7_proc __v7_cr7mp_proc_info, __v7_cr7mp_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS .size __v7_cr7mp_proc_info, . - __v7_cr7mp_proc_info /*@@ -649,7 +700,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup) __v7_cr8mp_proc_info: .long 0x410fc180 .long 0xff0ffff0 - __v7_proc __v7_cr8mp_proc_info, __v7_cr8mp_setup + __v7_proc __v7_cr8mp_proc_info, __v7_cr8mp_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS .size __v7_cr8mp_proc_info, . - __v7_cr8mp_proc_info
For R-class cores, the mitigation doesn't make much sense since we do not enforce user/kernel isolation anyway. I believe the same also applies to A-class cores built with !MMU, so you might want to guard CPU_SPECTRE with MMU in PATCH 05/14. Cheers Vladimir