On 02/21/2018 07:38 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:

Hi Laura,

On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 05:13:03PM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:

quoted

Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version

Neat!

quoted

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index ec2ee720e33e..b909b436293a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S

@@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk	.req	x28		// current thread_info
  
  	.text
  
+	.macro	erase_kstack
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+	bl	__erase_kstack
+#endif
+	.endm
  /*
   * Exception vectors.
   */

@@ -901,6 +906,7 @@ work_pending:
   */
  ret_to_user:
  	disable_daif
+	erase_kstack

I *think* this should happen in finish_ret_to_user a few lines down, since we
can call C code if we branch to work_pending, dirtying the stack.

I think you're right but this didn't immediately work when I tried it.
I'll have to dig into this some more.

quoted

  	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
  	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
  	cbnz	x2, work_pending

@@ -1337,3 +1343,105 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
  ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_handler)
  NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_handler)
  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
+
+/*
+ * This is what the stack looks like
+ *
+ * +---+ <- task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE
+ * |   |
+ * +---+ <- task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_START_SP
+ * |   |
+ * |   |
+ * +---+ <- task_pt_regs(p)

THREAD_START_SP got killed off in commit 34be98f4944f9907 as part of the
VMAP_STACK rework, so this can be:

       +---+ <- task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE
       |   |
       |   |
       +---+ <- task_pt_regs(p)
        ...

Good point.

quoted

+ * |   |
+ * |   |
+ * |   | <- current_sp
+ * ~~~~~
+ *
+ * ~~~~~
+ * |   | <- lowest_stack
+ * |   |
+ * |   |
+ * +---+ <- task_stack_page(p)
+ *
+ * This function is desgned to poison the memory between the lowest_stack
+ * and the current stack pointer. After clearing the stack, the lowest
+ * stack is reset.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ENTRY(__erase_kstack)
+	mov	x10, x0	// save x0 for the fast path

AFAICT, we only call this from ret_to_user, where x0 doesn't need to be
preserved.

Is that for ret_fast_syscall? In some cases, ret_fast_syscall can bypass
ret_to_user and calls kernel_exit directly, so we might need a call there.

This was a hold over when I was experimenting with calling  erase_kstack
more places, one of which came through ret_fast_syscall. I realized
later that the erase was unnecessary but accidentally kept the saving
in. I'll see about removing it assuming we don't decide later to put
a call on the fast path.

quoted

+
+	get_thread_info	x0
+	ldr	x1, [x0, #TSK_TI_LOWEST_STACK]
+
+	/* get the number of bytes to check for lowest stack */
+	mov	x3, x1
+	and	x3, x3, #THREAD_SIZE - 1
+	lsr	x3, x3, #3
+
+	/* generate addresses from the bottom of the stack */
+	mov	x4, sp
+	movn	x2, #THREAD_SIZE - 1
+	and	x1, x4, x2

Can we replace the MOVN;AND with a single instruction to clear the low bits?
e.g.

	mov	x4, sp
	bic	x1, x4, #THREAD_SIZE - 1

... IIUC BIC is an alias for the bitfield instructions, though I can't recall
exactly which one(s).

Good suggestion.

quoted

+
+	mov	x2, #STACKLEAK_POISON
+
+	mov	x5, #0
+1:
+	/*
+	 * As borrowed from the x86 logic, start from the lowest_stack
+	 * and go to the bottom to find the poison value.
+	 * The check of 16 is to hopefully avoid false positives.
+	 */
+	cbz	x3, 4f
+	ldr	x4, [x1, x3, lsl #3]
+	cmp	x4, x2
+	csinc	x5, xzr, x5, ne
+	tbnz	x5, #STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH/4, 4f	// found 16 poisons?
+	sub	x3, x3, #1
+	b	1b
+
+4:
+	/* total number of bytes to poison */
+	add     x5, x1, x3, lsl #3
+	mov	x4, sp
+	sub     x8, x4, x5
+
+	cmp     x8, #THREAD_SIZE // sanity check the range
+	b.lo    5f
+	ASM_BUG()
+
+5:
+	/*
+	 * We may have hit a path where the stack did not get used,
+	 * no need to do anything here
+	 */
+	cbz	x8, 7f
+
+	sub	x8, x8, #1 // don't poison the current stack pointer
+
+	lsr     x8, x8, #3
+	add     x3, x3, x8
+
+	/*
+	 * The logic of this loop ensures the last stack word isn't
+	 * ovewritten.
+	 */

Is that to ensure that we don't clobber the word at the current sp value?

Correct.

quoted

+6:
+	cbz     x8, 7f
+	str     x2, [x1, x3, lsl #3]
+	sub     x3, x3, #1
+	sub     x8, x8, #1
+	b	6b
+
+	/* Reset the lowest stack to the top of the stack */
+7:
+	mov	x1, sp
+	str	x1, [x0, #TSK_TI_LOWEST_STACK]
+
+	mov	x0, x10
+	ret
+ENDPROC(__erase_kstack)
+#endif

[...]

quoted

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 7b3ba40f0745..35ebbc1b17ff 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB)	+= -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
  KBUILD_CFLAGS			:= $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
  				   -D__NO_FORTIFY \
  				   $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \
-				   $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
+				   $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \
+				   $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)

I believe the KVM hyp code will also need to opt-out of this.

I'll double check that.

Thanks,
Mark.

Thanks,
Laura