[RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks
From: Laura Abbott <hidden>
Date: 2017-11-02 01:26:10
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On 11/01/2017 04:29 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Nov 1, 2017 at 4:05 PM, Laura Abbott [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 11/01/2017 03:28 PM, Kees Cook wrote:quoted
On Wed, Nov 1, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Laura Abbott [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 11/01/2017 05:05 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:quoted
On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 04:56:39PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:quoted
On 10/26/2017 02:09 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:quoted
In Prague, Kees mentioned that it would be nice to have a mechanism to catch bad __{get,put}_user uses, such as the recent CVE-2017-5123 [1,2] issue with unsafe_put_user() in waitid(). These patches allow an optional access_ok() check to be dropped in arm64's __{get,put}_user() primitives. These will then BUG() if a bad user pointer is passed (which should only happen in the absence of an earlier access_ok() check).quoted
Turning on the option fails as soon as we hit userspace. On my buildroot based environment I get the help text for ld.so (????) and then a message about attempting to kill init.Ouch. Thanks for the report, and sorry about this. The problem is that I evaluate the ptr argument twice in __{get,put}_user(), and this may have side effects. e.g. when the ELF loader does things like: __put_user((elf_addr_t)p, sp++) ... we increment sp twice, and write to the wrong user address, leaving sp corrupt. I have an additional patch [1] to fix this, which is in my arm64/access-ok branch [2]. Thanks, Mark. [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git/commit/?h=arm64/access-ok&id=ebb7ff83eb53b8810395d5cf48712a4ae6d678543 [2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git/log/?h=arm64/access-okThanks, the updated patch works. I wrote an LKDTM test to verify the expected behavior (__{get,put}_user panic whereas {get,put}_user do not). You're welcome to add Tested-by or I can wait for v2.Nice. :) Out of curiosity, can you check if this correctly BUG()s on a waitid() call when the fixes are reverted? 96ca579a1ecc ("waitid(): Avoid unbalanced user_access_end() on access_ok() error") 1c9fec470b81 ("waitid(): Add missing access_ok() checks") -KeesYep, we get a nice bug: [ 34.783912] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 34.784484] kernel BUG at kernel/exit.c:1614!Awesome! :) I wonder how hard it might be to make this happen on x86 too (or generically). Hmmm
x86 looks like it needs the same ptr_argument fixup as arm64 but seems to have a separate unsafe path so it's actually easier to fix up. I have version of this that seems to work so I'll clean it up and send it out tomorrow. Thanks, Laura