[PATCH REPOST] fs: Preventing READ_IMPLIES_EXEC Propagation
From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
Date: 2017-06-12 13:41:05
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-fsdevel, lkml
On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 02:58:01PM +0800, dongbo (E) wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
From: Dong Bo <redacted> In load_elf_binary(), once the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC flag is set, the flag is propagated to its child processes, even the elf files are marked as not requiring executable stack. It may cause superfluous operations on some arch, e.g. __sync_icache_dcache on aarch64 due to a PROT_READ mmap is also marked as PROT_EXEC. This patch was originally posted and discussed here: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9685891/ Signed-off-by: Dong Bo <redacted> --- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 ++ fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 5075fd5..c52e670 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c@@ -863,6 +863,8 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) SET_PERSONALITY2(loc->elf_ex, &arch_state); if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack)) current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; + else + current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space) current->flags |= PF_RANDOMIZE;diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index cf93a4f..c4bc4d0 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c@@ -354,6 +354,8 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) set_personality(PER_LINUX); if (elf_read_implies_exec(&exec_params.hdr, executable_stack)) current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; + else + current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; setup_new_exec(bprm); -- 1.9.1
FWIW, we queued the arm64-equivalent patch (commit 48f99c8ec0b25 in linux-next). It doesn't change the behaviour for compat tasks since we want to keep the same behaviour with arch/arm. If the above generic patch gets merged, we'll drop the arm64-specific one. -- Catalin