[PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
Date: 2016-09-14 10:27:00
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
Date: 2016-09-14 10:27:00
On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 11:13:33AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On 13 September 2016 at 18:46, Catalin Marinas [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
This is the third version of the arm64 PAN emulation using TTBR0_EL1 switching.
Given that every __get_user() call now incurs the PAN switch overhead, I wonder if it would be worth it to stash the real TTBR0_EL1 value in, e.g., TPIDRRO_EL0 rather than load it from memory each time. We'd have to reload the real value of TPIDRRO_EL0 at kernel exit every time, but only for compat tasks, and not nearly as often, obviously.
FWIW, my plan for vmap'd stacks involves clobbering TPIDRRO_EL0 early upon kernel entry to reliably detect/handle stack overflow (as we need to free up GPR to detect overflow, and we need to detect that before we try to store to the stack). For non-compat tasks we must restore zero, so either way we'll end up with a load (to determine compat-ness or to load the precise value). Thanks, Mark.