Re: [PATCH] Fix offset2lib issue for x86*, ARM*, PowerPC and MIPS

(I've added some additional CCs to make sure the arch maintainers
notice this patch.)

This patch seems white-space damaged to me. I had to do a lot of
manual editing to get it to apply. Please use "git format-patch", if
you're not already. What version of the kernel was this based on?

On Mon, Feb 23, 2015 at 10:37 AM, Hector Marco [off-list ref] wrote:

[PATCH] Fix offset2lib issue for x86*, ARM*, PowerPC and MIPS

The issue appears on PIE linked executables when all memory areas of a
process are randomized. In this case, the attack "offset2lib" de-randomizes
all library areas on 64 bit Linux systems in less than one second.


Further details of the PoC attack at:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html


This patch loads the PIE linked executable in a different area than the
libraries. The successful fix can be tested with a simple pie compiled
application:


$ ./show_mmaps_pie
54859ccd6000-54859ccd7000 r-xp  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
54859ced6000-54859ced7000 r--p  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
54859ced7000-54859ced8000 rw-p  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
7f75be764000-7f75be91f000 r-xp  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75be91f000-7f75beb1f000 ---p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb1f000-7f75beb23000 r--p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb23000-7f75beb25000 rw-p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb25000-7f75beb2a000 rw-p  ...
7f75beb2a000-7f75beb4d000 r-xp  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed45000-7f75bed46000 rw-p  ...
7f75bed46000-7f75bed47000 r-xp  ...
7f75bed47000-7f75bed4c000 rw-p  ...
7f75bed4c000-7f75bed4d000 r--p  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed4d000-7f75bed4e000 rw-p  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed4e000-7f75bed4f000 rw-p  ...
7fffb3741000-7fffb3762000 rw-p  ...  [stack]
7fffb377b000-7fffb377d000 r--p  ...  [vvar]
7fffb377d000-7fffb377f000 r-xp  ...  [vdso]


Once corrected, the PIE linked application is loaded in a different area.

Thanks for working on this!

We updated the "Fixing Offset2lib weakness" page:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/solutions/aslrv2/aslrv2.html


Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <redacted>

Acked-by: Kees Cook <redacted>

I think this is much cleaner now without
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE. I imagine there could be some follow-up
cleanups to standardize (or at least clearly document) the intended
levels of entropy in the 4 ASLR regions on each architecture, as it
currently varies a bit.

Thanks!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

[PATCH] Fix offset2lib issue for x86*, ARM*, PowerPC and MIPS

The issue appears on PIE linked executables when all memory areas of a
process are randomized. In this case, the attack "offset2lib" de-randomizes
all library areas on 64 bit Linux systems in less than one second.


Further details of the PoC attack at:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html


This patch loads the PIE linked executable in a different area than the
libraries. The successful fix can be tested with a simple pie compiled
application:


$ ./show_mmaps_pie
54859ccd6000-54859ccd7000 r-xp  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
54859ced6000-54859ced7000 r--p  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
54859ced7000-54859ced8000 rw-p  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
7f75be764000-7f75be91f000 r-xp  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75be91f000-7f75beb1f000 ---p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb1f000-7f75beb23000 r--p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb23000-7f75beb25000 rw-p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb25000-7f75beb2a000 rw-p  ...
7f75beb2a000-7f75beb4d000 r-xp  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed45000-7f75bed46000 rw-p  ...
7f75bed46000-7f75bed47000 r-xp  ...
7f75bed47000-7f75bed4c000 rw-p  ...
7f75bed4c000-7f75bed4d000 r--p  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed4d000-7f75bed4e000 rw-p  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed4e000-7f75bed4f000 rw-p  ...
7fffb3741000-7fffb3762000 rw-p  ...  [stack]
7fffb377b000-7fffb377d000 r--p  ...  [vvar]
7fffb377d000-7fffb377f000 r-xp  ...  [vdso]


Once corrected, the PIE linked application is loaded in a different area.

We updated the "Fixing Offset2lib weakness" page:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/solutions/aslrv2/aslrv2.html


Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <redacted>

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 97d07ed..ee7ea7e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
  config ARM
  	bool
  	default y
-	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
  	select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
  	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
  	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h
index afb9caf..6755cd8 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t,  

elf_gregset_t *elfregs);
     the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
     that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */

-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE / 3))

  /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be
     registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI.  A value of 0 means we

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
index 5e85ed3..9177100 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c

@@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
  	return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
  }

+static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+{
+	unsigned long rnd = 0;
+
+	/* 8 bits of randomness in 20 address space bits */
+	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+		rnd = (long)get_random_int() % (1 << 8);
+
+	return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
  static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
  {
  	unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);

@@ -230,3 +241,13 @@ int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
  }

  #endif
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index b1f9a20..5580d90 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
  config ARM64
  	def_bool y
-	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
  	select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
index 1f65be3..01d3aab 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ typedef struct user_fpsimd_state elf_fpregset_t;
   * that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.
   */
  extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3))

  /*
   * When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be

@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct  

mm_struct *mm);
  #define COMPAT_ELF_PLATFORM		("v8l")
  #endif

-#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(2 * TASK_SIZE_32 / 3)
+#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE_32 / 3))

  /* AArch32 registers. */
  #define COMPAT_ELF_NGREG		18

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
index 54922d1..980110c50 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c

@@ -89,6 +89,16 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_pick_mmap_layout);

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}
+

  /*
   * You really shouldn't be using read() or write() on /dev/mem.   

This might go

diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 3289969..31cc248 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ config MIPS
  	select HAVE_KRETPROBES
  	select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
  	select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
-	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
  	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if CPU_SUPPORTS_HUGEPAGES && 64BIT
  	select RTC_LIB if !MACH_LOONGSON
  	select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT

diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h
index eb4d95d..fcac4c99 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ extern const char *__elf_platform;
     that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.	*/

  #ifndef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(randomize_et_dyn(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2))
  #endif

  #define ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES 1

diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
index f1baadd..20ad644 100644
--- a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c

@@ -196,3 +196,13 @@ int __virt_addr_valid(const volatile void *kaddr)
  	return pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(kaddr)));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__virt_addr_valid);
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + brk_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index a2a168e..fa4c877 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig

@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ config PPC
  	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
  	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
  	select BINFMT_ELF
-	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
  	select OF
  	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
  	select OF_RESERVED_MEM

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
index 57d289a..4080425 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
     the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
     that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */

-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x20000000
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(randomize_et_dyn(0x20000000))

  #define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS (is_elf2_task() ? 2 : 0)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
index cb8bdbe..3e642e7 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c

@@ -97,3 +97,13 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
  		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
  	}
  }
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ba397bd..dcfe16c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ config X86
  	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
  	select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
  	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
-	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
  	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
  	select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
  	select SPARSE_IRQ

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index ca3347a..92c6ac4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -249,7 +249,8 @@ extern int force_personality32;
     the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
     that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */

-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(randomize_et_dyn(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2))

  /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
     instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 919b912..7b86605 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c

@@ -122,3 +122,12 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
  		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
  	}
  }
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/fs/Kconfig.binfmt b/fs/Kconfig.binfmt
index c055d56..1186190 100644
--- a/fs/Kconfig.binfmt
+++ b/fs/Kconfig.binfmt

@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ config COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF
  	bool
  	depends on COMPAT && BINFMT_ELF

-config ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
-	bool

  config ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
  	bool

diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 02b1691..72f7ff5 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c

@@ -908,21 +908,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  			 * default mmap base, as well as whatever program they
  			 * might try to exec.  This is because the brk will
  			 * follow the loader, and is not movable.  */
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
-			/* Memory randomization might have been switched off
-			 * in runtime via sysctl or explicit setting of
-			 * personality flags.
-			 * If that is the case, retain the original non-zero
-			 * load_bias value in order to establish proper
-			 * non-randomized mappings.
-			 */
-			if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
-				load_bias = 0;
-			else
-				load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
-#else
  			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
-#endif
  		}

  		error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt,

Kees Cook [off-list ref] escribi?:

(I've added some additional CCs to make sure the arch maintainers
notice this patch.)

This patch seems white-space damaged to me. I had to do a lot of
manual editing to get it to apply. Please use "git format-patch", if
you're not already. What version of the kernel was this based on?

On Mon, Feb 23, 2015 at 10:37 AM, Hector Marco [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

[PATCH] Fix offset2lib issue for x86*, ARM*, PowerPC and MIPS

The issue appears on PIE linked executables when all memory areas of a
process are randomized. In this case, the attack "offset2lib" de-randomizes
all library areas on 64 bit Linux systems in less than one second.


Further details of the PoC attack at:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html


This patch loads the PIE linked executable in a different area than the
libraries. The successful fix can be tested with a simple pie compiled
application:


$ ./show_mmaps_pie
54859ccd6000-54859ccd7000 r-xp  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
54859ced6000-54859ced7000 r--p  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
54859ced7000-54859ced8000 rw-p  ...  /tmp/show_mmaps_pie
7f75be764000-7f75be91f000 r-xp  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75be91f000-7f75beb1f000 ---p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb1f000-7f75beb23000 r--p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb23000-7f75beb25000 rw-p  ...  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
7f75beb25000-7f75beb2a000 rw-p  ...
7f75beb2a000-7f75beb4d000 r-xp  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed45000-7f75bed46000 rw-p  ...
7f75bed46000-7f75bed47000 r-xp  ...
7f75bed47000-7f75bed4c000 rw-p  ...
7f75bed4c000-7f75bed4d000 r--p  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed4d000-7f75bed4e000 rw-p  ...  /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
7f75bed4e000-7f75bed4f000 rw-p  ...
7fffb3741000-7fffb3762000 rw-p  ...  [stack]
7fffb377b000-7fffb377d000 r--p  ...  [vvar]
7fffb377d000-7fffb377f000 r-xp  ...  [vdso]


Once corrected, the PIE linked application is loaded in a different area.

Thanks for working on this!

quoted

We updated the "Fixing Offset2lib weakness" page:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/solutions/aslrv2/aslrv2.html


Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <redacted>

Acked-by: Kees Cook <redacted>

quoted

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 97d07ed..ee7ea7e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 config ARM
        bool
        default y
-       select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
        select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
        select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
        select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h
index afb9caf..6755cd8 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t, elf_gregset_t

*elfregs);
    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the
program
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */

-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE        (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE        (randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE / 3))

 /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be
    registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI.  A value of 0 means we

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
index 5e85ed3..9177100 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c

@@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
        return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
 }

+static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+{
+       unsigned long rnd = 0;
+
+       /* 8 bits of randomness in 20 address space bits */
+       if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+               rnd = (long)get_random_int() % (1 << 8);
+
+       return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
 static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
 {
        unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);

@@ -230,3 +241,13 @@ int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
 }

 #endif
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+       unsigned long ret;
+       if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+               !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+               return base;
+       ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+       return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index b1f9a20..5580d90 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 config ARM64
        def_bool y
-       select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
        select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
        select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
        select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
index 1f65be3..01d3aab 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ typedef struct user_fpsimd_state elf_fpregset_t;
  * that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.
  */
 extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE        (2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE        (randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3))

 /*
  * When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be

@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct

*mm);
 #define COMPAT_ELF_PLATFORM            ("v8l")
 #endif

-#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (2 * TASK_SIZE_32 / 3)
+#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE_32 /
3))

 /* AArch32 registers. */
 #define COMPAT_ELF_NGREG               18

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
index 54922d1..980110c50 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c

@@ -89,6 +89,16 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_pick_mmap_layout);

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+       unsigned long ret;
+       if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+               !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+               return base;
+       ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+       return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}
+

 /*
  * You really shouldn't be using read() or write() on /dev/mem.  This might

go

diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 3289969..31cc248 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ config MIPS
        select HAVE_KRETPROBES
        select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
        select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
-       select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
        select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE if CPU_SUPPORTS_HUGEPAGES &&

64BIT
        select RTC_LIB if !MACH_LOONGSON
        select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT

diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h
index eb4d95d..fcac4c99 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ extern const char *__elf_platform;
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */

 #ifndef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE                (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE                (randomize_et_dyn(TASK_SIZE / 3 *

2))
 #endif

 #define ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES 1

diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
index f1baadd..20ad644 100644
--- a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c

@@ -196,3 +196,13 @@ int __virt_addr_valid(const volatile void *kaddr)
        return pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(kaddr)));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__virt_addr_valid);
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+       unsigned long ret;
+       if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+               !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+               return base;
+       ret = base + brk_rnd();
+       return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index a2a168e..fa4c877 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig

@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ config PPC
        select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
        select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
        select BINFMT_ELF
-       select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
        select OF
        select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
        select OF_RESERVED_MEM

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
index 57d289a..4080425 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the

program
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */

-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE        0x20000000
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE        (randomize_et_dyn(0x20000000))

 #define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS (is_elf2_task() ? 2 : 0)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
index cb8bdbe..3e642e7 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c

@@ -97,3 +97,13 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
                mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
        }
 }
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+       unsigned long ret;
+       if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+               !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+               return base;
+       ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+       return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ba397bd..dcfe16c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ config X86
        select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
        select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK
        select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
-       select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
        select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
        select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
        select SPARSE_IRQ

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index ca3347a..92c6ac4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -249,7 +249,8 @@ extern int force_personality32;
    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the

program
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */

-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE                (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE                (randomize_et_dyn(TASK_SIZE / 3 *
2))

 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 919b912..7b86605 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c

@@ -122,3 +122,12 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
                mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
        }
 }
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+       unsigned long ret;
+       if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+               !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+               return base;
+       ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+       return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

diff --git a/fs/Kconfig.binfmt b/fs/Kconfig.binfmt
index c055d56..1186190 100644
--- a/fs/Kconfig.binfmt
+++ b/fs/Kconfig.binfmt

@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ config COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF
        bool
        depends on COMPAT && BINFMT_ELF

-config ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
-       bool

 config ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
        bool

diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 02b1691..72f7ff5 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c

@@ -908,21 +908,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                         * default mmap base, as well as whatever program

they
                         * might try to exec.  This is because the brk will
                         * follow the loader, and is not movable.  */
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE
-                       /* Memory randomization might have been switched off
-                        * in runtime via sysctl or explicit setting of
-                        * personality flags.
-                        * If that is the case, retain the original non-zero
-                        * load_bias value in order to establish proper
-                        * non-randomized mappings.
-                        */
-                       if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
-                               load_bias = 0;
-                       else
-                               load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE -
vaddr);
-#else
                        load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
-#endif
                }

                error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt,

I think this is much cleaner now without
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE. I imagine there could be some follow-up
cleanups to standardize (or at least clearly document) the intended
levels of entropy in the 4 ASLR regions on each architecture, as it
currently varies a bit.

Thanks!

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

* Hector Marco Gisbert [off-list ref] wrote:

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + brk_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

That pointless repetition should be avoided.

Thanks,

	Ingo

On Tue, 24 Feb 2015 08:39:06 +0100 Ingo Molnar [off-list ref] wrote:

* Hector Marco Gisbert [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + brk_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

That pointless repetition should be avoided.

That's surprisingly hard!

After renaming mips brk_rnd() to mmap_rnd() I had a shot.  I'm not very
confident in the result.  Does that __weak trick even work?

Someone tell me how important Hector's patch is?


From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix

Consolidate randomize_et_dyn() implementations into fs/binfmt_elf.c.

There doesn't seem to be a compile-time way of making randomize_et_dyn()
go away on architectures which don't need it, so mark it __weak to cause
it to be discarded at link time.

Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Hector Marco Gisbert <redacted>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <redacted>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <redacted>
Cc: Kees Cook <redacted>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <redacted>
Cc: Russell King <redacted>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <redacted>
Cc: Will Deacon <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h        |    3 +--
 arch/arm/mm/mmap.c                |   13 ++-----------
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h      |    3 +--
 arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c              |   14 ++------------
 arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h       |    1 -
 arch/mips/mm/mmap.c               |   13 ++-----------
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h    |    2 --
 arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c            |   13 ++-----------
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h        |    2 --
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c                |   12 ++----------
 fs/binfmt_elf.c                   |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/elf-randomization.h |    7 +++++++
 13 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

diff -puN arch/arm/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm/Kconfig
diff -puN arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #define __ASMARM_ELF_H
 
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
-
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 /*
  * ELF register definitions..
  */

@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t
    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
 
-extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE / 3))
 
 /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be 

diff -puN arch/arm/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm/mm/mmap.c

--- a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/shm.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <asm/cachetype.h>

@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
 	return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
 }
 
-static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
 {
 	unsigned long rnd = 0;
 

@@ -241,13 +242,3 @@ int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
 }
 
 #endif
-
-unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
-{
-	unsigned long ret;
-	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
-		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
-		return base;
-	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
-	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
-}

diff -puN arch/arm64/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm64/Kconfig

--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-config ARM64
+qconfig ARM64
 	def_bool y
 	select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL

diff -puN arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
+ * Copyright (C) 20q12 ARM Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as

@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ typedef struct user_fpsimd_state elf_fpr
  * the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
  * that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.
  */
-extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(randomize_et_dyn(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3))
 
 /*

diff -puN arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c

--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>

@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
 	return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
 }
 
-static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
 {
 	unsigned long rnd = 0;
 

@@ -89,17 +90,6 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_pick_mmap_layout);
 
-unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
-{
-	unsigned long ret;
-	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
-		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
-		return base;
-	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
-	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
-}
-
-
 /*
  * You really shouldn't be using read() or write() on /dev/mem.  This might go
  * away in the future.

diff -puN arch/mips/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/mips/Kconfig
diff -puN arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h

--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -402,7 +402,6 @@ extern const char *__elf_platform;
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.	*/
 
 #ifndef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
-extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(randomize_et_dyn(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2))
 #endif
 

diff -puN arch/mips/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/mips/mm/mmap.c

--- a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/mips/mm/mmap.c

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>

@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
 	}
 }
 
-static inline unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
 {
 	unsigned long rnd = get_random_int();
 

@@ -196,13 +197,3 @@ int __virt_addr_valid(const volatile voi
 	return pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(kaddr)));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__virt_addr_valid);
-
-unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
-{
-	unsigned long ret;
-	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
-		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
-		return base;
-	ret = base + brk_rnd();
-	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
-}

diff -puN arch/powerpc/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/powerpc/Kconfig
diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h

--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@
    use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(randomize_et_dyn(0x20000000))
 
 #define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS (is_elf2_task() ? 2 : 0)

diff -puN arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c

--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 

@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ static inline int mmap_is_legacy(void)
 	return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
 }
 
-static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
 {
 	unsigned long rnd = 0;
 

@@ -97,13 +98,3 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
 	}
 }
-
-unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
-{
-	unsigned long ret;
-	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
-		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
-		return base;
-	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
-	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
-}

diff -puN arch/x86/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/x86/Kconfig
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h

@@ -248,8 +248,6 @@ extern int force_personality32;
    use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-extern unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(randomize_et_dyn(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2))
 
 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what

diff -puN arch/x86/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/x86/mm/mmap.c

--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/limits.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 #include <asm/elf.h>
 
 struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {

@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
 	return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
 }
 
-static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
 {
 	unsigned long rnd = 0;
 

@@ -122,12 +123,3 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
 	}
 }
-unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
-{
-	unsigned long ret;
-	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
-		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
-		return base;
-	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
-	return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
-}

diff -puN fs/Kconfig.binfmt~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix fs/Kconfig.binfmt
diff -puN fs/binfmt_elf.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix fs/binfmt_elf.c

--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/fs/binfmt_elf.c

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/elfcore.h>
+#include <linux/elf-randomization.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/highuid.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>

@@ -2300,6 +2301,26 @@ out:
 
 #endif		/* CONFIG_ELF_CORE */
 
+/* Not all architectures implement mmap_rnd() */
+unsigned long __weak mmap_rnd(void)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Not all architectures use randomize_et_dyn(), so use __weak to let the
+ * linker omit it from vmlinux
+ */
+unsigned long __weak randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+
+	if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+		!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+		return base;
+	ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+	return max(ret, base);
+}
+
 static int __init init_elf_binfmt(void)
 {
 	register_binfmt(&elf_format);

diff -puN include/linux/elf.h~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix include/linux/elf.h
diff -puN /dev/null include/linux/elf-randomization.h

--- /dev/null
+++ a/include/linux/elf-randomization.h

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#ifndef __ELF_RANDOMIZATION_H
+#define __ELF_RANDOMIZATION_H
+
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base);
+unsigned long mmap_rnd(void);
+
+#endif	/* __ELF_RANDOMIZATION_H */

_

On 02/26/2015 02:38 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
[...]

From: Andrew Morton<akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix

Consolidate randomize_et_dyn() implementations into fs/binfmt_elf.c.

There doesn't seem to be a compile-time way of making randomize_et_dyn()
go away on architectures which don't need it, so mark it __weak to cause
it to be discarded at link time.

Cc: "H. Peter Anvin"<hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt<benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas<catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Hector Marco Gisbert<redacted>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert<redacted>
Cc: Ingo Molnar<mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll<redacted>
Cc: Kees Cook<redacted>
Cc: Ralf Baechle<redacted>
Cc: Russell King<redacted>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner<redacted>
Cc: Will Deacon<redacted>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton<akpm@linux-foundation.org>

[...]

This particular change looks like it may be a typo.

   *
   * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as

On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 02:38:15PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:

Is this a typo?

-- 
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line: currently at 10.5Mbps down 400kbps up
according to speedtest.net.

On Thu, 26 Feb 2015 23:00:52 +0000 Russell King - ARM Linux [off-list ref] wrote:

On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 02:38:15PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:

quoted

diff -puN arch/arm64/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix arch/arm64/Kconfig

--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix
+++ a/arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-config ARM64
+qconfig ARM64

Is this a typo?

yup.  But the coffee's nice and strong.

On Thu, 26 Feb 2015 14:38:15 -0800 Andrew Morton [off-list ref] wrote:

Does that __weak trick even work?

Nope.

--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c~fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix-fix
+++ a/fs/binfmt_elf.c

@@ -2307,10 +2307,10 @@ unsigned long __weak mmap_rnd(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * Not all architectures use randomize_et_dyn(), so use __weak to let the
- * linker omit it from vmlinux
+ * Not all architectures use randomize_et_dyn(), but there doesn't seem to be
+ * a compile-time way of avoiding its generation.
  */
-unsigned long __weak randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
 {
 	unsigned long ret;
 

_

Hi Andrew,

[Just resending to correct addresses - sorry for those who get a duplicate]

On Thu, 26 Feb 2015 14:38:15 -0800 Andrew Morton [off-list ref] wrote:

Didn't we have some trouble with some compilers when the weak function
(mmap_rnd) was defined and used in the same file i.e. the wrong one was
used?

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell                    sfr at canb.auug.org.au
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 819 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/attachments/20150227/3c80d6c1/attachment.sig>

On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Andrew Morton
[off-list ref] wrote:

On Tue, 24 Feb 2015 08:39:06 +0100 Ingo Molnar [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

* Hector Marco Gisbert [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+   unsigned long ret;
+   if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+           !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+           return base;
+   ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+   return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+   unsigned long ret;
+   if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+           !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+           return base;
+   ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+   return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+   unsigned long ret;
+   if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+           !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+           return base;
+   ret = base + brk_rnd();
+   return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+   unsigned long ret;
+   if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+           !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+           return base;
+   ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+   return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

quoted

+unsigned long randomize_et_dyn(unsigned long base)
+{
+   unsigned long ret;
+   if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
+           !(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+           return base;
+   ret = base + mmap_rnd();
+   return (ret > base) ? ret : base;
+}

That pointless repetition should be avoided.

That's surprisingly hard!

After renaming mips brk_rnd() to mmap_rnd() I had a shot.  I'm not very
confident in the result.  Does that __weak trick even work?

In theory, it shouldn't be needed since only randomize_et_dyn will
call mmap_rnd, and only architectures that use randomize_et_dyn will
call it ... and will define mmap_rnd.

Someone tell me how important Hector's patch is?

I consider it a reasonable improvement to userspace ASLR. I look at it
more as a new feature than a bug fix, but it could be argued as a bug
fix too.

From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: fix-offset2lib-issue-for-x86-arm-powerpc-and-mips-fix

Consolidate randomize_et_dyn() implementations into fs/binfmt_elf.c.

There doesn't seem to be a compile-time way of making randomize_et_dyn()
go away on architectures which don't need it, so mark it __weak to cause
it to be discarded at link time.

Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Hector Marco Gisbert <redacted>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <redacted>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <redacted>
Cc: Kees Cook <redacted>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <redacted>
Cc: Russell King <redacted>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <redacted>
Cc: Will Deacon <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Acked-by: Kees Cook <redacted>

Thanks for fixing it up!

-Kees