mm: insure topdown mmap chooses addresses above security minimum
From: mingo@kernel.org (Ingo Molnar)
Date: 2013-09-25 07:30:56
Also in:
linux-mips, linux-mm, linux-sh, linuxppc-dev, sparclinux
* Timothy Pepper [off-list ref] wrote:
A security check is performed on mmap addresses in security/security.c:security_mmap_addr(). It uses mmap_min_addr to insure mmaps don't get addresses lower than a user configurable guard value (/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr). The arch specific mmap topdown searches look for a map candidate address all the way down to a low_limit that is currently hard coded as PAGE_SIZE. Depending on compile time options and userspace setting the procfs tunable, the security check's view of the minimum allowable address may be something greater than PAGE_SIZE. This leaves a gap where get_unmapped_area()'s call to get_area() might return an address above PAGE_SIZE, but below mmap_min_addr, and thus get_unmapped_area() fails. This was seen on x86_64 in the case of a topdown address space and a large stack rlimit, with mmap_min_addr having been set to 32k by the distro. This left a 28k gap where the get area search intends to place a small mmap, but then get_unmapped_area() stumbles at the security check. What should have happened is the address search wraps back to a higher address, the search continues and perhaps succeeds. Indeed an mmap of a larger size gets a topdown search that does wrap around back up into the rlimit stack reserve and succeeds assuming suitable free space. But a small mmap fits in the low gap and always fails. It becomes possible to make large mmaps but not small ones. When an explicit address hint is given, mm/mmap.c's round_hint_to_min() will round up to mmap_min_addr. A topdown search's low_limit should similarly consider mmap_min_addr instead of just PAGE_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Tim Pepper <redacted> Cc: linux-mm at kvack.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <redacted> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86 at kernel.org Cc: Russell King <redacted> Cc: linux-arm-kernel at lists.infradead.org Cc: Ralf Baechle <redacted> Cc: linux-mips at linux-mips.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <redacted> Cc: linuxppc-dev at lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Paul Mundt <redacted> Cc: linux-sh at vger.kernel.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: sparclinux at vger.kernel.org -- arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 3 ++- arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 3 ++- arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c | 3 ++- arch/sh/mm/mmap.c | 3 ++- arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c | 3 ++- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr)); info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base; info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0; info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; - info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; + info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr)); info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base; addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
- info.low_limit = addr; + info.low_limit = max(addr, PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr));
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; info.length = len; - info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; + info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr)); info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base; info.align_mask = do_colour_align ? (PAGE_MASK & shm_align_mask) : 0; info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; info.length = len; - info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; + info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr)); info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base; info.align_mask = do_color_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0; info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; info.length = len; - info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; + info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr)); info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base; info.align_mask = filp ? get_align_mask() : 0; info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
There appears to be a lot of repetition in these methods - instead of changing 6 places it would be more future-proof to first factor out the common bits and then to apply the fix to the shared implementation. Thanks, Ingo