On 03/14/2012 11:47 AM, Nicolas Ferre wrote:
...

I do have the will to avoid the treats of memory corruption in case of
malformed DT data, as Stephen was saying. But, on the other hand I do
not know really if this can happen: if the .xlate() function which is
provided by the DMA controller is well written, it should check for
proper args_count or maximum string size. I do not have the feeling that
adding an enum will enforce the security here.

Do you know a way to enforce security of this "void *" parameter or the
check of number of cells + the due diligence of .xlate() function
writers will be enough?

I guess if the only source of the data is a driver's of_xlate function,
and it's only being passed back to that same driver and never
interpreted elsewhere, then its probably reasonable to assume that's
enough for safety.