On Thu, 10 Jun 2010, Nicolas Pitre wrote:

On Thu, 10 Jun 2010, Catalin Marinas wrote:

quoted

On Thu, 2010-06-10 at 01:56 +0100, Nicolas Pitre wrote:

quoted

On Wed, 9 Jun 2010, Catalin Marinas wrote:

quoted

On Wed, 2010-06-09 at 20:10 +0100, Nicolas Pitre wrote:

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Sorry for the delay... I'm just starting to seriously look at this.

On Wed, 2 Jun 2010, Catalin Marinas wrote:

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This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
__switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.

[...]

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The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if HAS_TLS_REG is defined
since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page isn't possible.

I don't like this limitation much.

Since the vector page has to be accessed somehow for FIQs anyway, and
the current solution for that involves accesses through the direct
mapping of the vector page, then this patch could be made to work on
pre-ARMv6 systems too simply by adding the necessary cache ops around
the TLS and FIQ updates.

Getting rid of domains in Linux requires that several functions no
longer use LDRT/STRT but LDR/STR. This implies that RO user pages should
also have RO permissions for the kernel. I don't have the old ARM ARM at
hand now but I recall there were some issues with user RO kernel RO
permission on pre-ARMv6 processors (there is an R bit in the CP15
control register which may help, I need to check the documentation).

I just checked.  It says:

   The access permission bits in section and page descriptors control
   access to the corresponding section or page. The access permissions
   are modified by the System (S) and ROM (R) control bits in CP15
   register 1.

But those bits are of no use as they are effective only when the MMU
access permission bits are all 0, otherwise they're ignored.

OK. So for read-only user pages we could set AP to 00 and R to 1 so that
pages are read-only for kernel as well. For the other cases we just use
a non-zero AP.

But what about non existing pages?  They can't go through with a read 
access from the first memory page.

Well... that looks like this is simply unworkable.  The R bit is global, 
so as soon as you have it on then kernel access to any memory will 
always succeed.  There is no way to have kernel RO user RO and still 
have no access on missing pages.

   Table 3-3 MMU access permissions

            Privileged    User
   AP   S R permissions   permissions

   0b00 0 0 No access     No access
   0b00 1 0 Read only     No access
   0b00 0 1 Read only     Read only
   0b00 1 1 UNPREDICTABLE UNPREDICTABLE
   0b01 x x Read/write    No access
   0b10 x x Read/write    Read only
   0b11 x x Read/write    Read/write


Nicolas