Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] x86/alternatives: use temporary mm for text poking
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: 2018-08-29 09:28:53
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On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 01:11:46AM -0700, Nadav Amit wrote:
+static void text_poke_fixmap(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len,
+ struct page *pages[2])
+{
+ u8 *vaddr;
+
+ set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0, page_to_phys(pages[0]));
+ if (pages[1])
+ set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1, page_to_phys(pages[1]));
+ vaddr = (u8 *)fix_to_virt(FIX_TEXT_POKE0);
+ memcpy(vaddr + offset_in_page(addr), opcode, len);
+
+ /*
+ * clear_fixmap() performs a TLB flush, so no additional TLB
+ * flush is needed.
+ */
+ clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0);
+ if (pages[1])
+ clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1);
+ sync_core();
+ /* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
+ that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */Please take this opportunity to fix that comment style.
+}
+
+__ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
+__ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
+
+/**
+ * text_poke_safe() - Pokes the text using a separate address space.
+ *
+ * This is the preferable way for patching the kernel after boot, as it does not
+ * allow other cores to accidentally or maliciously modify the code using the
+ * temporary PTEs.
+ */
+static void text_poke_safe(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len,
+ struct page *pages[2])
+{
+ temporary_mm_state_t prev;
+ pte_t pte, *ptep;
+ spinlock_t *ptl;
+
+ /*
+ * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding.
+ */
+ ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, &ptl);
+
+ pte = mk_pte(pages[0], PAGE_KERNEL);
+ set_pte_at(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep, pte);
+
+ if (pages[1]) {
+ pte = mk_pte(pages[1], PAGE_KERNEL);
+ set_pte_at(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1, pte);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Loading the temporary mm behaves as a compiler barrier, which
+ * guarantees that the PTE will be set at the time memcpy() is done.
+ */
+ prev = use_temporary_mm(poking_mm);
+
+ memcpy((u8 *)poking_addr + offset_in_page(addr), opcode, len);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the PTE is only cleared after copying is done by using a
+ * compiler barrier.
+ */
+ barrier();I tripped over the use of 'done', because even with TSO the store isn't done once the instruction retires. All we want to ensure is that the pte_clear() store is issued after the copy, and that is indeed guaranteed by this.
+ pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep); + + /* + * __flush_tlb_one_user() performs a redundant TLB flush when PTI is on, + * as it also flushes the corresponding "user" address spaces, which + * does not exist. + * + * Poking, however, is already very inefficient since it does not try to + * batch updates, so we ignore this problem for the time being. + * + * Since the PTEs do not exist in other kernel address-spaces, we do + * not use __flush_tlb_one_kernel(), which when PTI is on would cause + * more unwarranted TLB flushes. + */
yuck :-), but yeah.
+ __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr);
+ if (pages[1]) {
+ pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1);
+ __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Loading the previous page-table hierarchy requires a serializing
+ * instruction that already allows the core to see the updated version.
+ * Xen-PV is assumed to serialize execution in a similar manner.
+ */
+ unuse_temporary_mm(prev);
+
+ pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
+}