Thread (35 messages) 35 messages, 7 authors, 2016-07-15

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2016-07-15 19:23:17
Also in: linux-arm-kernel, linux-mm, linuxppc-dev, lkml, sparclinux

On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 12:19 PM, Daniel Micay [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
I'd like it to dump stack and be fatal to the process involved, but
yeah, I guess BUG() would work. Creating an infrastructure for
handling security-related Oopses can be done separately from this
(and
I'd like to see that added, since it's a nice bit of configurable
reactivity to possible attacks).
In grsecurity, the oops handling also uses do_group_exit instead of
do_exit but both that change (or at least the option to do it) and the
exploit handling could be done separately from this without actually
needing special treatment for USERCOPY. Could expose is as something
like panic_on_oops=2 as a balance between the existing options.
I'm also uncomfortable about BUG() being removed by unsetting
CONFIG_BUG, but that seems unlikely. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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