Re: [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: 2012-02-27 19:26:24
Also in:
lkml, netdev
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: 2012-02-27 19:26:24
Also in:
lkml, netdev
On Mon, 2012-02-27 at 10:55 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 8:49 AM, Eric Paris [off-list ref] wrote:
You mean as used in audit_log_exit() ? It looks like that depends on a lot of state cached in __audit_syscall_entry() and finally triggered in __audit_syscall_exit() (and ..._free()). I don't think this is really want seccomp wants to be involved in. By CONFIG_AUDITSC, you mean CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL? Without that set, audit_seccomp is a no-op. The reason compat needs to be reported (or rather, arch) is because just reporting syscall is ambiguous. It either needs arch or compat to distinguish it.
Yes, that is what I mean and you are right. You shouldn't push the syscall in this record either. If !audit_dummy_context() you are already going to get arch, syscall, and a0-a4 in the associated audit record. Please do not duplicate that info. It might make sense to have a separate audit_seccomp() path when audit_dummy_context() which includes arch, syscall, and a0-a4. It is my fault (85e7bac3) that we have syscall at all, but I'm on a new crusade to remove audit record duplication. So I'd happily see a patch in this series that removes that instead of adds to it. -Eric