On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:03:32PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 03:36:50PM +0100, yeoreum.yun@arm.com wrote:
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Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 09:57:25AM +0100, yeoreum.yun@arm.com wrote:
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On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 09:27:42AM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
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Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 02:52:19PM +0100, yeoreum.yun@arm.com wrote:
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On Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 01:32:49PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
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Wed, Nov 04, 2026 at 08:46:22PM +0100, jgg@ziepe.ca wrote:
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On Wed, Nov 04, 2026 at 07:11:44PM +0000, Yeoreum Yun wrote:
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[..snip..]
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+static int attestation_evidence_request_decode(struct attestation *att, struct ctlv_op_ctx *ctx,
+ const struct ctlv_cursor *request,
+ struct attestation_evidence_request *decoded,
+ struct attestation_evidence_object_request **objects)
+{
+ const struct attestation_evidence_caps *caps = att->provider->evidence_caps;
+ u32 challenge_length;
+
+ decoded->challenge =
+ ctlv_attestation_evidence_get_evidence_challenge_get(request, &challenge_length);
+ decoded->challenge_length = challenge_length;
+ if (challenge_length < caps->min_challenge_length ||
+ challenge_length > caps->max_challenge_length)
Hmm, I'm not sure whether this check is required for
ATTESTATION_EVIDENCE_BLOB_EVENT_LOG blob type.
for example, if the provider provides two evidence:
- ATTESTATION_EVIDENCE_BLOB_PRIMARY (might attestation token)
- ATTESTATION_EVIDENCE_BLOB_EVENT_LOG
might challenge is reuiqred for generating the token
and this would be marked at min/max_challenge_size in evidence_cap.
However, in case of eventlog, it wouldn't require challenge.
for example, TPM event log or CCEL event log.
Right
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Do we need some field on attestation_evidence_supported_object whether
it requires challenge or not and applies this sanity check per the object?
Otherwise, to get eventlog, it would need to send *dummy* challenge
always.
I wonder if we should have two interfaces here for signed and unsigned
evidence? It would be clearer for userspace then when it needs to
provide a challenge or not.
Isn't the challenge field provided/not-provided enough?
Currently on the introspection side, device-get op would provide
challenge-lengths array:
evidence?:
challenge-lengths[8]:
length?: uint(..4096)
min-length?: uint(..4096)
max-length?: uint(..4096)
objects[16]:
blob-class: evidence-blob-class
max-length: uint
blob-instance?: uint(..u32-max)
I think it would make sense to have challenge-lengths array per object:
objects[16]:
blob-class: evidence-blob-class
max-length: uint
blob-instance?: uint(..u32-max)
challenge-lengths[8]:
length?: uint(..4096)
min-length?: uint(..4096)
max-length?: uint(..4096)
Then the unsigned object would just simply have challenge-lengths empty?
This looks good to me. :)
The challenge is one of several open points that all depend on what an
evidence object is: Rick's TDREPORT, legacy versus DICE Quotes,
"primary", "raw" and the format strings. Here is my proposal to settle
these together:
The model:
1. device-get lists each object with an id, a class (signed, event-log,
cert-chain or auxiliary), the formats it may come in, its max-length
and, for signed objects only, challenge-lengths.
2. evidence-get names objects by id, as MR ops name MRs, each with its
output blob. It carries a challenge exactly when it names a signed
object, and the challenge has to fit each of them.
3. The reply gives each object's format, length and, where the TCB
vouches for it, the TCB's digest. The output is always {label, data}.
4. A signed object is made by the call, over the challenge, and never
reused. The rest are read as they stand.
This settles following issues discussed during this patchset review:
1. One op, not two. Per-object challenge-lengths tell userspace when to
pass a challenge, and one call returns the signed object with the log
and certificates needed to check it.
2. TDX's TDREPORT goes: it is MAC'd for the platform, not signed.
/dev/tdx_guest keeps TDX_CMD_GET_REPORT0.
3. TDX's Quote object lists the legacy and the DICE format. The provider
labels what the host returned and fails on a Quote it cannot label.
4. "primary" becomes "signed", manifest joins auxiliary, spdm-vca,
spdm-measurements and tdisp-report become formats, and signature
goes, as a signed object carries its own.
5. "raw" goes with the representation attr. The TCB digest is a reply
field, so a blob always holds the object's own bytes.
Formats become an enum each provider family defines, instead of free
strings. I'm still unsure if format should be entirely provider-specific
and defined as "extension", or it should be somehow mixture of common
and provider-specific. Looks there is not really much common
anyway, so I lean towards provider-specific only. So far I have:
Overall, This is plausible for me with some small question.
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====== ============ ========== ========= ===========================
Family Format Class Challenge Bytes
====== ============ ========== ========= ===========================
[...]
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tpm ek-cert cert-chain none EK certificate from NV
Just a thought, but how are we planning to retrieve
the NV index for EK certificate?
As far as I know, TPM NV storage doesn't support labeling.
Should I assume that the NV index would be specified as part of the
challenge to retrieve the certificate from TPM NV storage?
evidence-get allows to accept mr-selection as part of the request
alongside the challenge.
Sorry. Could you explain a little bit detail for this?.
AFAIU, this is to get the EK certificate from TPM non-volatile storage.
But, I don't know why *EK* certificate get would be relevant for
*mr selection*. AFAIK, the TPM_Quote will be used AK not a EK.
You are right, my mistake. I misunderstood the question.
mr-selection selects PCRs for Quote, or an extend-NV measurement
register for NV Certify.
An NV-resident EK certificate is retrieved using NV_Read. I think
blob-instance is a good fit. For TPM certificate objects, it could
identify the certificate's NV index.
Ah. I missed the TCG_EK_Credential_Profile specification which defines
the NV index value for EK certificate:
2.2.1.4 Low Range
The Low Range is at NV Indices 0x01c00002 - 0x01c0000c.
0x01c00002 RSA 2048 EK Certificate
0x01c00003 RSA 2048 EK Nonce
0x01c00004 RSA 2048 EK Template
0x01c0000a ECC NIST P256 EK Certificate
0x01c0000b ECC NIST P256 EK Nonce
0x01c0000c ECC NIST P256 EK Template
But, do we need some argument to get which EK certificate to get?
(RSA or ECC NIST P256)?
Otherwise, Is this interface going to print all EK certificate
regardless of alg?
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Also, AFAIK, mr_selection is meaningful when the evidence_accept is
supported.
These are independent. mr-selection chooses the measurements included
in evidence. EVIDENCE_ACCEPT authorizes a subsequent native transition.
The TPM provider can quote selected PCRs without supporting acceptance.
Acked.
--
Sincerely,
Yeoreum Yun