On Mon, 2026-10-19 at 09:10 -0700, Dionna Glaze wrote:
On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 5:08 AM Jiri Pirko [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Yeah, I was thinking about this and went back and forth. In the end, the
only reason for leaving it unbounded is to allow multiple independent
users of the same register. For example, IMA and systemd could share a
TDX RTMR. The systemd side would read the journal through the
attestation device and the IMA side through securityfs, but both are
views of the same journal. If one side truncated it, the other could no
longer replay the RTMR. Isn't this the valid usecase? Do you see how to
resolve this?
Bright minds have spent a significant amount of time working on this.
+Roberto Sassu, +Mimi Zohar
Dionna, thank you for including us in this discussion.
Based on my questioning AI, it sounds like the purpose of this patch set is to
introduce a vendor-agnostic common attestation subsystem framework that can act
as an internal kernel multiplexor for any measurement consumer, like IMA or
DRTM. By providing a direct kernel-to-kernel call path, it allows measurements
to be routed to different Roots of Trust (ROT)—such as physical motherboard
TPMs, Intel TDX RTMRs, AMD SEV-SNP registers, and PCIe SPDM devices—without
hardcoding IMA to specific device drivers.
To support this framework, IMA requires a strict, atomic execution sequence to
maintain the Measure → Extend → Execute (Measure Before Use) guarantee. This
initializes early during the late_initcall phase within the initramfs (via
dracut).
If the new subsystem introduces a direct kernel-to-kernel multiplexing call
path, how will it ensure the mandatory synchronous wait behavior when extending
multiple hardware backends?
I strongly agree with Jason’s point that we should table any discussions
regarding a new dynamic log or uAPI additions at this stage, and focus strictly
on exposing the static firmware-level TDX log. I also echo Jiri’s concern that
replacing the securityfs template log with a placeholder string would break
backwards compatibility for the existing IMA ecosystem.
Thanks,
Mimi
IMA logs and systemd logs are both system level concerns that are
relevant to the OS construction, not individual users,
so I would just say to reroute IMA to use ctlv using a kernel config
setting, then make systemd the new system manager of the holistic log.
The securityfs log contents can simply say, "log managed by ctlv" in
this setting, in the form of the template identifier.
For policy violations, only the 0... extend needs to go to ctlv.
IMA can still keep its violation log as a ring buffer when it's not a
1-to-1 violation to extension