@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 fuse_mnt
 fusectl_test
+test_syncfs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -g $(KHDR_INCLUDES)
 
-TEST_GEN_PROGS := fusectl_test
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := fusectl_test test_syncfs
 TEST_GEN_FILES := fuse_mnt
 
 include ../../lib.mk

@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test that FUSE_SYNCFS is propagated to a userspace server only when the
+ * server opts in with FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS *and* opened /dev/fuse with
+ * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace.
+ *
+ * Unlike the libfuse-based selftests, this talks the raw FUSE wire protocol
+ * over /dev/fuse so it can (a) choose whether to advertise FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS in
+ * the INIT reply and (b) observe directly whether a FUSE_SYNCFS opcode arrives.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/eventfd.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/fuse.h>
+
+#include "../../kselftest.h"
+
+#define FUSE_ROOT_ID 1
+
+/*
+ * Add or drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the effective set via raw capget/capset
+ * (avoids a libcap dependency).  Used to construct a server that opens
+ * /dev/fuse without the privilege FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS requires.
+ */
+static int set_sysadmin(int on)
+{
+	struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = {
+		.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3,
+		.pid = 0,
+	};
+	struct __user_cap_data_struct data[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3] = {};
+	unsigned int idx = CAP_SYS_ADMIN >> 5;
+	__u32 bit = 1U << (CAP_SYS_ADMIN & 31);
+
+	if (syscall(SYS_capget, &hdr, data))
+		return -1;
+	if (on)
+		data[idx].effective |= bit;
+	else
+		data[idx].effective &= ~bit;
+	return syscall(SYS_capset, &hdr, data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * eventfd the server child writes once when it receives FUSE_SYNCFS; the
+ * parent poll()s it to observe (or rule out) propagation.
+ */
+static int syncfs_evfd;
+
+static void reply(int fd, uint64_t unique, int error, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	struct fuse_out_header oh = {
+		.len = sizeof(oh) + len,
+		.error = error,
+		.unique = unique,
+	};
+	struct iovec iov[2] = {
+		{ &oh, sizeof(oh) },
+		{ data, len },
+	};
+
+	if (writev(fd, iov, data ? 2 : 1) < 0)
+		ksft_print_msg("server writev failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void fill_attr(struct fuse_attr *a, uint64_t ino, uint32_t mode,
+		      uint32_t nlink)
+{
+	memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+	a->ino = ino;
+	a->mode = mode;
+	a->nlink = nlink;
+	a->blksize = 4096;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Minimal FUSE server.  Advertises FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS in its INIT reply iff
+ * @advertise is set.  Signals syncfs_evfd when a FUSE_SYNCFS opcode arrives.
+ */
+#define SERVER_MAX_WRITE 65536
+static void run_server(int fd, int advertise)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The kernel rejects reads (EINVAL) whose buffer is smaller than
+	 * max_write + header, so size generously for the max_write we
+	 * advertise in the INIT reply below.
+	 */
+	static char buf[SERVER_MAX_WRITE + 4096];
+
+	for (;;) {
+		ssize_t n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		struct fuse_in_header *ih = (void *)buf;
+
+		if (n < 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+				continue;
+			return;		/* device closed on unmount/abort */
+		}
+		if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(*ih))
+			continue;
+
+		switch (ih->opcode) {
+		case FUSE_INIT: {
+			struct fuse_init_in *in = (void *)(ih + 1);
+			struct fuse_init_out out = {0};
+			uint64_t flags = FUSE_INIT_EXT;
+
+			out.major = FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION;
+			out.minor = FUSE_KERNEL_MINOR_VERSION;
+			out.max_readahead = in->max_readahead;
+			out.max_write = SERVER_MAX_WRITE;
+			out.max_background = 16;
+			out.congestion_threshold = 12;
+			if (advertise)
+				flags |= FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS;
+			out.flags = flags;
+			out.flags2 = flags >> 32;
+			reply(fd, ih->unique, 0, &out, sizeof(out));
+			break;
+		}
+		case FUSE_GETATTR: {
+			struct fuse_attr_out out = {0};
+
+			fill_attr(&out.attr, FUSE_ROOT_ID, S_IFDIR | 0755, 2);
+			reply(fd, ih->unique, 0, &out, sizeof(out));
+			break;
+		}
+		case FUSE_SYNCFS: {
+			uint64_t one = 1;
+
+			if (write(syncfs_evfd, &one, sizeof(one)) < 0)
+				ksft_print_msg("server eventfd write failed: %s\n",
+					       strerror(errno));
+			reply(fd, ih->unique, 0, NULL, 0);
+			break;
+		}
+		default:
+			/*
+			 * Anything else (e.g. OPENDIR from opening the mount
+			 * root) is not needed to drive this test; -ENOSYS lets
+			 * the kernel proceed.
+			 */
+			reply(fd, ih->unique, -ENOSYS, NULL, 0);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mount a fuse fs backed by a forked server, issue syncfs(), and report
+ * whether the server observed FUSE_SYNCFS.  Returns 0 on success, -1 if the
+ * environment could not support the test (caller should skip).
+ *
+ * If @unpriv_open is set, /dev/fuse is opened with CAP_SYS_ADMIN dropped
+ * (regained only for the mount() syscall), so the device opener -- the
+ * server principal FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS is gated on -- lacks the privilege even
+ * though it remains in the initial user namespace.
+ */
+static int do_mount_and_syncfs(const char *mnt, int advertise, int unpriv_open,
+			       int *seen)
+{
+	struct pollfd pfd = { .events = POLLIN };
+	char opts[256];
+	int fd, mfd = -1, i;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	syncfs_evfd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
+	if (syncfs_evfd < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (unpriv_open && set_sysadmin(0))
+		goto out_evfd;
+	fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR);
+	if (unpriv_open && set_sysadmin(1)) {
+		if (fd >= 0)
+			close(fd);
+		goto out_evfd;
+	}
+	if (fd < 0)
+		goto out_evfd;
+
+	mkdir(mnt, 0755);
+	snprintf(opts, sizeof(opts),
+		 "fd=%d,rootmode=40000,user_id=%d,group_id=%d",
+		 fd, getuid(), getgid());
+
+	if (mount("fuse", mnt, "fuse", 0, opts) < 0)
+		goto out_fd;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0)
+		goto out_umount;
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		run_server(fd, advertise);
+		_exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The parent does not service the fuse fd; the child does.  Close our
+	 * copy so the kernel sees a single server, and so that if the child
+	 * dies the connection aborts instead of hanging us forever.
+	 */
+	close(fd);
+
+	/*
+	 * mount() returns before the server has answered FUSE_INIT, so the
+	 * first open() can race and fail with ENOTCONN; retry until the
+	 * handshake settles.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+		mfd = open(mnt, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+		if (mfd >= 0)
+			break;
+		usleep(1000);
+	}
+	if (mfd >= 0) {
+		syncfs(mfd);
+		close(mfd);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * No waiting is needed: the server writes syncfs_evfd before it replies
+	 * to FUSE_SYNCFS, and that reply is what unblocks the synchronous
+	 * syncfs() above.  So once syncfs() has returned, the eventfd is already
+	 * signalled if the opcode was propagated, and will never be otherwise.
+	 * poll() with a zero timeout therefore decides both cases immediately.
+	 */
+	pfd.fd = syncfs_evfd;
+	*seen = poll(&pfd, 1, 0) > 0 && (pfd.revents & POLLIN);
+
+	kill(pid, SIGKILL);
+	waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+	umount2(mnt, MNT_DETACH);
+	close(syncfs_evfd);
+	return 0;
+
+out_umount:
+	umount2(mnt, MNT_DETACH);
+out_fd:
+	close(fd);
+out_evfd:
+	close(syncfs_evfd);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* T4: same as above but the mount is created inside a new user namespace. */
+static int run_in_userns(const char *mnt, int advertise, int *seen)
+{
+	uid_t uid = getuid();
+	gid_t gid = getgid();
+	char map[64];
+	int f;
+
+	if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0)
+		return -1;	/* unprivileged userns mounts unavailable */
+
+	f = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);
+	if (f >= 0) {
+		dprintf(f, "deny");
+		close(f);
+	}
+	snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %d 1", uid);
+	f = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY);
+	if (f < 0 || dprintf(f, "%s", map) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	close(f);
+	snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %d 1", gid);
+	f = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY);
+	if (f < 0 || dprintf(f, "%s", map) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	close(f);
+
+	/* Need a mount namespace where we can mount fuse unprivileged. */
+	if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	return do_mount_and_syncfs(mnt, advertise, 0, seen);
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	char mnt[] = "/tmp/fuse_syncfs_XXXXXX";
+	int seen, ret;
+
+	ksft_print_header();
+	ksft_set_plan(4);
+
+	/* Hard watchdog: never let a stuck syncfs hang the test runner. */
+	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	alarm(60);
+
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		ksft_exit_skip("test requires root to mount fuse\n");
+
+	if (!mkdtemp(mnt))
+		ksft_exit_fail_msg("mkdtemp failed\n");
+
+	/* T1: host-root mount, server opts in -> syncfs must reach server. */
+	ret = do_mount_and_syncfs(mnt, 1, 0, &seen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		ksft_test_result_skip("T1: could not mount fuse\n");
+	else
+		ksft_test_result(seen,
+				 "T1 host-root + FUSE_HAS_SYNCFS: server receives FUSE_SYNCFS\n");
+
+	/* T2: host-root mount, server does NOT opt in -> no FUSE_SYNCFS. */
+	ret = do_mount_and_syncfs(mnt, 0, 0, &seen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		ksft_test_result_skip("T2: could not mount fuse\n");
+	else
+		ksft_test_result(!seen,
+				 "T2 host-root, no opt-in: server does NOT receive FUSE_SYNCFS\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * T3: server opts in but opened /dev/fuse without CAP_SYS_ADMIN while
+	 * still in the initial user namespace -> kernel must withhold
+	 * FUSE_SYNCFS.  This is the case that distinguishes gating on the
+	 * server's privilege from gating on the mount's user namespace.
+	 */
+	ret = do_mount_and_syncfs(mnt, 1, 1, &seen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		ksft_test_result_skip("T3: could not mount fuse unprivileged\n");
+	else
+		ksft_test_result(!seen,
+				 "T3 init_userns, opener lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN: FUSE_SYNCFS withheld\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * T4: unprivileged userns mount, server opts in -> kernel must still
+	 * withhold FUSE_SYNCFS.  Run in a child since it unshares namespaces.
+	 */
+	{
+		pid_t p = fork();
+
+		if (p == 0) {
+			int s = 0;
+			int r = run_in_userns(mnt, 1, &s);
+
+			_exit(r < 0 ? 2 : (s ? 1 : 0));
+		} else {
+			int status;
+
+			waitpid(p, &status, 0);
+			if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+				ksft_test_result_error("T4: child crashed\n");
+			else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) == 2)
+				ksft_test_result_skip("T4: userns fuse mount unavailable\n");
+			else
+				ksft_test_result(WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0,
+						 "T4 unpriv userns + opt-in: FUSE_SYNCFS withheld\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	rmdir(mnt);
+	ksft_finished();
+}