On Tue, Jan 6, 2026 at 9:57 PM Leon Hwang [off-list ref] wrote:

On 7/1/26 01:44, bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org wrote:

quoted

quoted

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 14fc5738f2b9..e64cc7504731 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c

[ ... ]

quoted

@@ -6279,7 +6345,11 @@ static int __sys_bpf(enum bpf_cmd cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size,

     switch (cmd) {
     case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
-            err = map_create(&attr, uattr);
+            common_attrs.log_true_size = 0;
+            err = map_create(&attr, uattr, &common_attrs);
+            ret = copy_common_attr_log_true_size(uattr_common, size_common,
+                                                 &common_attrs.log_true_size);
+            err = ret ? ret : err;

When map_create() succeeds, it returns a file descriptor that is already
installed in the caller's fd table via bpf_map_new_fd(). If
copy_common_attr_log_true_size() then fails (e.g., user provided a
read-only buffer for uattr_common), the syscall returns -EFAULT but the
fd remains installed.

Could this leak the file descriptor? The user gets an error and has no
way to know what fd number was allocated, so they cannot close it.

Good catch — you’re right.

If 'map_create()' succeeds and 'copy_common_attr_log_true_size()' later
fails (e.g. returning -EFAULT), the newly created file descriptor would
remain installed and could be leaked.

I’ll fix this in the next revision by explicitly closing the fd when
ret is non-zero.

No. The refactoring was wrong. Don't make the kernel do extra work.
Patch 3 introduced a bug and closing fd is not a solution.
Such a pattern can be exploited for DoS.