Thread (15 messages) 15 messages, 5 authors, 2025-02-02

Re: [PATCH v2] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering

From: Jiri Olsa <hidden>
Date: 2025-01-30 21:53:51
Also in: bpf, linux-trace-kernel, lkml, stable

On Thu, Jan 30, 2025 at 07:05:42AM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
On Thu, Jan 30, 2025 at 12:24 AM Jiri Olsa [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Jan 29, 2025 at 09:27:49AM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
quoted
Hi,

Thanks for the review!

On Tue, Jan 28, 2025 at 5:41 PM Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Tue, Jan 28, 2025 at 06:58:06AM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
quoted
Note: uretprobe isn't supported in i386 and __NR_ia32_rt_tgsigqueueinfo
uses the same number as __NR_uretprobe so the syscall isn't forced in the
compat bitmap.
So a 64-bit tracer cannot use uretprobe on a 32-bit process? Also is
uretprobe strictly an x86_64 feature?
My understanding is that they'd be able to do so, but use the int3 trap
instead of the uretprobe syscall.
quoted
quoted
[...]
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 385d48293a5f..23b594a68bc0 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -734,13 +734,13 @@ seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)

 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
 /**
- * seccomp_is_const_allow - check if filter is constant allow with given data
+ * seccomp_is_filter_const_allow - check if filter is constant allow with given data
  * @fprog: The BPF programs
  * @sd: The seccomp data to check against, only syscall number and arch
  *      number are considered constant.
  */
-static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
-                                struct seccomp_data *sd)
+static bool seccomp_is_filter_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
+                                       struct seccomp_data *sd)
 {
      unsigned int reg_value = 0;
      unsigned int pc;
@@ -812,6 +812,21 @@ static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
      return false;
 }

+static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
+                                struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
+     if (sd->nr == __NR_uretprobe
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+         && sd->arch != SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+#endif
I don't like this because it's not future-proof enough. __NR_uretprobe
may collide with other syscalls at some point.
I'm not sure I got this point.
quoted
And if __NR_uretprobe_32
is ever implemented, the seccomp logic will be missing. I think this
will work now and in the future:

#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
# ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
        if (sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT) {
#  ifdef __NR_uretprobe_32
                if (sd->nr == __NR_uretprobe_32)
                        return true;
#  endif
        } else
# endif
        if (sd->nr == __NR_uretprobe)
                return true;
#endif
I don't know if implementing uretprobe syscall for compat binaries is
planned or makes sense - I'd appreciate Jiri's and others opinion on that.
That said, I don't mind adding this code for the sake of future proofing.
as Andrii wrote in the other email ATM it's just strictly x86_64,
but let's future proof it
Thank you. So I'm ok with using the suggestion above, but more on this below.
quoted
AFAIK there was an attempt to do similar on arm but it did not show
any speed up
quoted
quoted
Instead of doing a function rename dance, I think you can just stick
the above into seccomp_is_const_allow() after the WARN().
My motivation for the renaming dance was that you mentioned we might add
new syscalls to this as well, so I wanted to avoid cluttering the existing
function which seems to be well defined.
quoted
Also please add a KUnit tests to cover this in
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
I think this would mean that this test suite would need to run as
privileged. Is that Ok? or maybe it'd be better to have a new suite?
quoted
With at least these cases combinations below. Check each of:

        - not using uretprobe passes
        - using uretprobe passes (and validates that uretprobe did work)

in each of the following conditions:

        - default-allow filter
        - default-block filter
        - filter explicitly blocking __NR_uretprobe and nothing else
        - filter explicitly allowing __NR_uretprobe (and only other
          required syscalls)
Ok.
please let me know if I can help in any way with tests
Thanks! Is there a way to partition this work? I'd appreciate the help
if we can find some way of doing so.
sure, I'll check the seccomp selftests and let you know
quoted
quoted
quoted
Hm, is uretprobe expected to work on mips? Because if so, you'll need to
do something similar to the mode1 checking in the !SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
version of seccomp_cache_check_allow().
I don't know if uretprobe syscall is expected to run on mips. Personally
I'd avoid adding this dead code.
Jiri, what is your take on this one?
uretprobe syscall is not expected to work on mips, atm it's strictly x86_64

jirka
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