On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 12:41:45PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Fri, 2024-11-22 at 15:50 +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
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On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 03:34:47PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
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Hi Mickaël,
On Tue, 2024-11-12 at 20:18 +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
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+
+/* Returns 1 on error, 0 otherwise. */
+static int interpret_stream(FILE *script, char *const script_name,
+ char *const *const envp, const bool restrict_stream)
+{
+ int err;
+ char *const script_argv[] = { script_name, NULL };
+ char buf[128] = {};
+ size_t buf_size = sizeof(buf);
+
+ /*
+ * We pass a valid argv and envp to the kernel to emulate a native
+ * script execution. We must use the script file descriptor instead of
+ * the script path name to avoid race conditions.
+ */
+ err = execveat(fileno(script), "", script_argv, envp,
+ AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK);
At least with v20, the AT_CHECK always was being set, independent of whether
set-exec.c set it. I'll re-test with v21.
AT_EXECVE_CEHCK should always be set, only the interpretation of the
result should be relative to securebits. This is highlighted in the
documentation.
Sure, that sounds correct. With an IMA-appraisal policy, any unsigned script
with the is_check flag set now emits an "cause=IMA-signature-required" audit
message. However since IMA-appraisal isn't enforcing file signatures, this
sounds wrong.
New audit messages like "IMA-signature-required-by-interpreter" and "IMA-
signature-not-required-by-interpreter" would need to be defined based on the
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE.
It makes sense. Could you please send a patch for these
IMA-*-interpreter changes? I'll include it in the next series.
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+ if (err && restrict_stream) {
+ perror("ERROR: Script execution check");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Reads script. */
+ buf_size = fread(buf, 1, buf_size - 1, script);
+ return interpret_buffer(buf, buf_size);
+}
+