On Tue, Jul 16, 2024 at 08:02:37AM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 1:57 AM Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:
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On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 09:26:14AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 11:58:25AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
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Here is another proposal:
We can change a bit the semantic by making it the norm to always check
file executability with AT_CHECK, and using the securebits to restrict
file interpretation and/or command injection (e.g. user supplied shell
commands). Non-executable checked files can be reported/logged at the
kernel level, with audit, configured by sysadmins.
New securebits (feel free to propose better names):
- SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE: requires AT_CHECK to pass.
Would you want the enforcement of this bit done by userspace or the
kernel?
IIUC, userspace would always perform AT_CHECK regardless of
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, and then which would happen?
1) userspace would ignore errors from AT_CHECK when
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is unset
Yes, that's the idea.
quoted
or
2) kernel would allow all AT_CHECK when SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is
unset
I suspect 1 is best and what you intend, given that
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE can only be enforced by userspace.
Indeed. We don't want AT_CHECK's behavior to change according to
securebits.
One bit is good.
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- SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE: deny any command injection via
command line arguments, environment variables, or configuration files.
This should be ignored by dynamic linkers. We could also have an
allow-list of shells for which this bit is not set, managed by an
LSM's policy, if the native securebits scoping approach is not enough.
Different modes for script interpreters:
1. RESTRICT_FILE=0 DENY_INTERACTIVE=0 (default)
Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands.
=> No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get
ahead of potential issues with logs to prepare for a migration to a
restrictive mode.
2. RESTRICT_FILE=1 DENY_INTERACTIVE=0
Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and allow
arbitrary user commands.
=> Threat: (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not
fooled) users. That could protect against unintended script
executions (e.g. sh /tmp/*.sh).
==> Makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.
3. RESTRICT_FILE=1 DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
any arbitrary user commands.
=> Threat: malicious scripts run by untrusted users.
==> Makes sense for system services executing scripts.
4. RESTRICT_FILE=0 DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
=> Goal: monitor/measure/assess script content (e.g. with IMA/EVM) in
a system where the access rights are not (yet) ready. Arbitrary
user commands would be much more difficult to monitor.
==> First step of restricting system services that should not
directly pass arbitrary commands to shells.
I like these bits!
Good! Jeff, Steve, Florian, Matt, others, what do you think?
For below two cases: will they be restricted by one (or some) mode above ?
1> cat /tmp/a.sh | sh
2> sh -c "$(cat /tmp/a.sh)"
Yes, DENY_INTERACTIVE=1 is to deny both of these cases (i.e. arbitrary
user command).
These other examples should be allowed with AT_CHECK and RESTRICT_FILE=1
if a.sh is executable though:
* sh /tmp/a.sh
* sh < /tmp/a.sh