Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits

On Tue, Jul 16, 2024 at 08:02:37AM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:

On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 1:57 AM Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:

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On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 09:26:14AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

quoted

On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 11:58:25AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:

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Here is another proposal:

We can change a bit the semantic by making it the norm to always check
file executability with AT_CHECK, and using the securebits to restrict
file interpretation and/or command injection (e.g. user supplied shell
commands).  Non-executable checked files can be reported/logged at the
kernel level, with audit, configured by sysadmins.

New securebits (feel free to propose better names):

- SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE: requires AT_CHECK to pass.

Would you want the enforcement of this bit done by userspace or the
kernel?

IIUC, userspace would always perform AT_CHECK regardless of
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, and then which would happen?

1) userspace would ignore errors from AT_CHECK when
   SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is unset

Yes, that's the idea.

quoted

or

2) kernel would allow all AT_CHECK when SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is
   unset

I suspect 1 is best and what you intend, given that
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE can only be enforced by userspace.

Indeed. We don't want AT_CHECK's behavior to change according to
securebits.

One bit is good.

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- SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE: deny any command injection via
  command line arguments, environment variables, or configuration files.
  This should be ignored by dynamic linkers.  We could also have an
  allow-list of shells for which this bit is not set, managed by an
  LSM's policy, if the native securebits scoping approach is not enough.

Different modes for script interpreters:

1. RESTRICT_FILE=0 DENY_INTERACTIVE=0 (default)
   Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands.
   => No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get
   ahead of potential issues with logs to prepare for a migration to a
   restrictive mode.

2. RESTRICT_FILE=1 DENY_INTERACTIVE=0
   Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and allow
   arbitrary user commands.
   => Threat: (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not
      fooled) users.  That could protect against unintended script
      executions (e.g. sh /tmp/*.sh).
   ==> Makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.

3. RESTRICT_FILE=1 DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
   Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
   any arbitrary user commands.
   => Threat: malicious scripts run by untrusted users.
   ==> Makes sense for system services executing scripts.

4. RESTRICT_FILE=0 DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
   Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
   => Goal: monitor/measure/assess script content (e.g. with IMA/EVM) in
      a system where the access rights are not (yet) ready.  Arbitrary
      user commands would be much more difficult to monitor.
   ==> First step of restricting system services that should not
       directly pass arbitrary commands to shells.

I like these bits!

Good! Jeff, Steve, Florian, Matt, others, what do you think?

For below two cases: will they be restricted by one (or some) mode above ?

1> cat /tmp/a.sh | sh

2> sh -c "$(cat /tmp/a.sh)"

Yes, DENY_INTERACTIVE=1 is to deny both of these cases (i.e. arbitrary
user command).

These other examples should be allowed with AT_CHECK and RESTRICT_FILE=1
if a.sh is executable though:
* sh /tmp/a.sh
* sh < /tmp/a.sh