[PATCHv6 bpf-next 1/9] x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Date: 2024-05-21 10:48:45
Also in:
bpf, linux-man, linux-trace-kernel, lkml
Subsystem:
the rest, uprobes, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers:
Linus Torvalds, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen
Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash
if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel
code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update
shadow stack accordingly.
Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using
them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe
changes to user stack.
Fixes: 8b1c23543436 ("x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 7 ++++++-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
index 42fee8959df7..896909f306e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clon void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p); int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig); int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void); +int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val); #else static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {} static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; } static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; } +static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 6f1e9883f074..9797d4cdb78a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c@@ -577,3 +577,14 @@ long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2) return wrss_control(true); return -EINVAL; } + +int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) +{ + unsigned long ssp; + + if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)) + return 0; + + ssp = get_user_shstk_addr(); + return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val); +}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 6c07f6daaa22..6402fb3089d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c@@ -1076,8 +1076,13 @@ arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(unsigned long trampoline_vaddr, struct pt_regs return orig_ret_vaddr; nleft = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, &trampoline_vaddr, rasize); - if (likely(!nleft)) + if (likely(!nleft)) { + if (shstk_update_last_frame(trampoline_vaddr)) { + force_sig(SIGSEGV); + return -1; + } return orig_ret_vaddr; + } if (nleft != rasize) { pr_err("return address clobbered: pid=%d, %%sp=%#lx, %%ip=%#lx\n",
--
2.45.0