Re: Chromium sandbox on LoongArch and statx -- seccomp deep argument inspection again?
From: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Date: 2024-02-26 16:50:10
Also in:
linux-arch, lkml, loongarch
From: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Date: 2024-02-26 16:50:10
Also in:
linux-arch, lkml, loongarch
On Mon, 2024-02-26 at 16:40 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
quoted
I definitely don't want to see a new time32 API added to mips64 and the 32-bit architectures, so the existing stat64 interface won't work as a statx replacement.I don't specifically care but the same way you don't want to see newer time32 apis added to architectures I don't want to have hacks in our system calls that aren't even a clear solution to the problem outlined in this thread.
So we should have a fstat_whatever64, IMO.
Short of adding fstatx() the problem isn't solved by a new flag to statx() as explained in my other mails. But I'm probably missing something here because I find this notion of "design system calls for seccomp and the Chromium sandbox" to be an absurd notion and it makes me a bit impatient.
I'm sharing the feeling on seccomp and/or (mis)uses of it, but using statx() or fstatat() for fstat() has a performance impact as they must inspect path (do a uaccess) and make sure it's an empty string, and Linus concluded "if the user want fstat, you should give the user fstat" for this issue: https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-alpha/2023-September/151365.html If it was just seccomp I'd not comment on this topic at all. -- Xi Ruoyao [off-list ref] School of Aerospace Science and Technology, Xidian University