Thread (24 messages) 24 messages, 7 authors, 2024-02-26

Re: Chromium sandbox on LoongArch and statx -- seccomp deep argument inspection again?

From: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Date: 2024-02-26 16:50:10
Also in: linux-arch, lkml, loongarch

On Mon, 2024-02-26 at 16:40 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
quoted
I definitely don't want to see a new time32 API added to
mips64 and the 32-bit architectures, so the existing stat64
interface won't work as a statx replacement.
I don't specifically care but the same way you don't want to see newer
time32 apis added to architectures I don't want to have hacks in our
system calls that aren't even a clear solution to the problem outlined
in this thread.
So we should have a fstat_whatever64, IMO.
Short of adding fstatx() the problem isn't solved by a new flag to
statx() as explained in my other mails. But I'm probably missing
something here because I find this notion of "design system calls for
seccomp and the Chromium sandbox" to be an absurd notion and it makes me
a bit impatient.
I'm sharing the feeling on seccomp and/or (mis)uses of it, but using
statx() or fstatat() for fstat() has a performance impact as they must
inspect path (do a uaccess) and make sure it's an empty string, and
Linus concluded "if the user want fstat, you should give the user fstat"
for this issue:

https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-alpha/2023-September/151365.html

If it was just seccomp I'd not comment on this topic at all.

-- 
Xi Ruoyao [off-list ref]
School of Aerospace Science and Technology, Xidian University
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