Thread (54 messages) 54 messages, 6 authors, 2023-07-12

Re: [PATCH v9 23/42] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description

From: szabolcs.nagy@arm.com <hidden>
Date: 2023-06-22 09:28:17
Also in: linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml

The 06/21/2023 18:54, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
On Wed, 2023-06-21 at 12:36 +0100, szabolcs.nagy@arm.com wrote:
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The 06/20/2023 19:34, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
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I actually did a POC for this, but rejected it. The problem is,
if
there is a shadow stack overflow at that point then the kernel
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can't
push the shadow stack token to the old stack. And shadow stack
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overflow
is exactly the alt shadow stack use case. So it doesn't really
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solve
the problem.
the restore token in the alt shstk case does not regress anything
but
makes some use-cases work.

alt shadow stack is important if code tries to jump in and out of
signal handlers (dosemu does this with swapcontext) and for that a
restore token is needed.

alt shadow stack is important if the original shstk did not
overflow
but the signal handler would overflow it (small thread stack, huge
sigaltstack case).

alt shadow stack is also important for crash reporting on shstk
overflow even if longjmp does not work then. longjmp to a
makecontext
stack would still work and longjmp back to the original stack can
be
made to mostly work by an altshstk option to overwrite the top
entry
with a restore token on overflow (this can break unwinding though).
There was previously a request to create an alt shadow stack for the
purpose of handling shadow stack overflow. So you are now suggesting to
to exclude that and instead target a different use case for alt shadow
stack?
that is not what i said.
But I'm not sure how much we should change the ABI at this point since
we are constrained by existing userspace. If you read the history, we
may end up needing to deprecate the whole elf bit for this and other
reasons.
i'm not against deprecating the elf bit, but i think binary
marking will be difficult for this kind of feature no matter what
(code may be incompatible for complex runtime dependent reasons).
So should we struggle to find a way to grow the existing ABI without
disturbing the existing userspace? Or should we start with something,
finally, and see where we need to grow and maybe get a chance at a
fresh start to grow it?

Like, maybe 3 people will show up saying "hey, I *really* need to use
shadow stack and longjmp from a ucontext stack", and no one says
anything about shadow stack overflow. Then we know what to do. And
maybe dosemu decides it doesn't need to implement shadow stack (highly
likely I would think). Now that I think about it, AFAIU SS_AUTODISARM
was created for dosemu, and the alt shadow stack patch adopted this
behavior. So it's speculation that there is even a problem in that
scenario.

Or maybe people just enable WRSS for longjmp() and directly jump back
to the setjmp() point. Do most people want fast setjmp/longjmp() at the
cost of a little security?

Even if, with enough discussion, we could optimize for all
hypotheticals without real user feedback, I don't see how it helps
users to hold shadow stack. So I think we should move forward with the
current ABI.
you may not get a second chance to fix a security feature.
it will be just disabled if it causes problems.
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