Re: [PATCH mm-unstable] mm/madvise: remove CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement for process_madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)

On Tue, Aug 2, 2022 at 5:04 AM Michal Hocko [off-list ref] wrote:

On Tue 02-08-22 02:48:33, Zach O'Keefe wrote:
[...]

quoted

"mm/madvise: add MADV_COLLAPSE to process_madvise()" in the v7 series
ended with me mentioning a couple options, but ultimately I didn't
present a solution, and no consensus was reached[1]. After taking a
closer look, this is my proposal for what I believe to be the best
path forward. It should be squashed into the original patch. What do you think?

If it is agreed that the CAP_SYS_ADMIN is too strict of a requirement
then yes, this should be squashed into the original patch. There is no
real reason to create a potential bisection headache by changing the
permission model in a later patch.

Sorry about the confusion here. Assumed (incorrectly) that Andrew
would kindly squash this in mm-unstable since I added the Fixes: tag.
Next time I'll add some explicit verbiage saying it should be
squashed.

From my POV, I would agree that CAP_SYS_ADMIN is just too strict of a
requirement.

I didn't really have time to follow recent discussions but I would argue
that the operation is not really destructive or seriously harmful. All
applications can already have their memory (almost) equally THP
collapsed by khupaged with the proposed process_madvise semantic.

NOHUGEMEM and prctl opt out from THP are both honored AFAIU and the only
difference is the global THP killswitch behavior which I do not think
warrants the strongest CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (especially because it
doesn't really control all kinds of THPs).

Ya. In fact, I don't think the ignoring the THP sysfs controls
warrants any additional capability (set alone CAPS_SYS_ADMIN), since a
malicious program can't really inflict any more damage than they would
with CAP_SYS_NICE and PTRACE_MODE_READ.

If there is a userspace agent collapsing memory and causing problems
then it can be easily fixed in the userspace. And I find that easier
to do than putting the bar so high that userspace agents would be
unfeasible because of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (which is nono in many cases as it
would allow essentially full control of other stuff). So from practical
POV, risking an extended RSS is really a negligible risk to lose a
potentially useful feature for all others.

Agreed.

Thanks for taking the time, Michal!
Zach

Just my 2c

quoted

Thanks again,
Zach

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Ys4aTRqWIbjNs1mI@google.com/ (local)

--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs