Re: [PATCH v18 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Date: 2021-05-10 18:02:41
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-arm-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-kselftest, linux-mm, linux-riscv, lkml
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 11:47:47AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 10:33 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:quoted
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:quoted
What's happening with O_CLOEXEC in this code? I don't see that mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking secrets into other processes.I actually thought we forced it, so I'll let Mike address this. I think allowing it is great, so the secret memory isn't inherited by children, but I can see use cases where a process would want its child to inherit the secrets.
We do not enforce O_CLOEXEC, but if the user explicitly requested O_CLOEXEC it would be passed to get_unused_fd_flags(). -- Sincerely yours, Mike.