On Fri, May 21 2021 at 18:19, Florian Weimer wrote:
* Dave Hansen:
quoted
On 5/21/21 7:44 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
quoted
Why can't userspace look at XCR0 to make the decision?
The thing we're trying to avoid is a #NM exception from XFD (the new
first-use detection feature) that occurs on the first use of AMX.
XCR0 will have XCR0[AMX]=1, even if XFD is "armed" and ready to
generate the #NM.
I see. So essentially the hardware wants to offer transparent
initialize-on-use, but Linux does not seem to want to implement it this
way.
The hardware offers an exception which can be used to implement that,
but the hardware does not dictate that usage.
If we'd go that way we lost any control over that resource and I can
demonstrate with AVX512 today what kind of consequences that has with
mixed criticality realtime workloads.
The only solution we have today is to disable AVX512 completely, which
sucks because restricted usage can be benefitial for some of the
computations.
The problem is that the approach of user space in general seems to be
blindly_select_max(AVX). I've seen that in quite some places.
With AMX (and the stuff coming next) we have the chance to do proper
resource control and it would be outright stupid not to take that
opportunity.
Thanks,
tglx