Re: [PATCH v24 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
From: Kirill A. Shutemov <hidden>
Date: 2021-04-09 15:57:21
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:56PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB). Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted> Cc: Kees Cook <redacted> --- v24: - Rename cet.c to shstk.c, update related areas accordingly. arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 29 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 164 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.cdiff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aa85d599b184 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct task_struct; +/* + * Per-thread CET status + */ +struct cet_status { + unsigned long shstk_base; + unsigned long shstk_size; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK +int shstk_setup(void); +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p); +void shstk_disable(void); +#else +static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; } +static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {} +static inline void shstk_disable(void) {} +#endif + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index f1b9ed5efaa9..a5d703fda74e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86; #include <asm/unwind_hints.h> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/cache.h>@@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET + struct cet_status cet; +#endif + /* Floating point and extended processor state */ struct fpu fpu; /*diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 2ddf08351f0b..0f99b093f350 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5406fdf6df3c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support + * + * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation. + * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> + */ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/sizes.h> +#include <linux/user.h> +#include <asm/msr.h> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> + +static void start_update_msrs(void) +{ + fpregs_lock(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + __fpregs_load_activate(); +} + +static void end_update_msrs(void) +{ + fpregs_unlock(); +} + +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + unsigned long addr, populate; + + /* VM_SHADOW_STACK requires MAP_ANONYMOUS, MAP_PRIVATE */ + flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
Looks like all callers has flags == 0. Do I miss something.
+ + mmap_write_lock(mm); + addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0, + &populate, NULL); + mmap_write_unlock(mm); + + if (populate) + mm_populate(addr, populate);
If all callers pass down flags==0, populate will never happen.
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+int shstk_setup(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
+ addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+ cet->shstk_base = addr;
+ cet->shstk_size = size;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ end_update_msrs();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !cet->shstk_size ||
+ !cet->shstk_base)
+ return;
+
+ if (!tsk->mm)
+ return;
+
+ while (1) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
+
+ /*
+ * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
+ * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
+ * long time. Retry it for the case.
+ */Hm, no. -EINTR is not about the lock being held by somebody else. The task got a signal and need to return to userspace. I have not looked at the rest of the patches yet, but why do you need a special free path for shadow stack? Why the normal unmap route doesn't work for you?
+ if (r == -EINTR) {
+ cond_resched();
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cet->shstk_base = 0;
+ cet->shstk_size = 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_disable(void)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+ u64 msr_val;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !cet->shstk_size ||
+ !cet->shstk_base)
+ return;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ end_update_msrs();
+
+ shstk_free(current);
+}
--
2.21.0
-- Kirill A. Shutemov