Thread (51 messages) 51 messages, 3 authors, 2020-10-29

Re: [PATCH ghak90 V9 11/13] audit: contid check descendancy and nesting

From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: 2020-07-05 15:11:52
Also in: linux-fsdevel, lkml, netdev, netfilter-devel

On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 9:23 AM Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Require the target task to be a descendant of the container
orchestrator/engine.

You would only change the audit container ID from one set or inherited
value to another if you were nesting containers.

If changing the contid, the container orchestrator/engine must be a
descendant and not same orchestrator as the one that set it so it is not
possible to change the contid of another orchestrator's container.

Since the task_is_descendant() function is used in YAMA and in audit,
remove the duplication and pull the function into kernel/core/sched.c

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <redacted>
---
 include/linux/sched.h    |  3 +++
 kernel/audit.c           | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 kernel/sched/core.c      | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 33 ---------------------------------
 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 2213ac670386..06938d0b9e0c 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2047,4 +2047,7 @@ static inline void rseq_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)

 const struct cpumask *sched_trace_rd_span(struct root_domain *rd);

+extern int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
+                             struct task_struct *child);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index a862721dfd9b..efa65ec01239 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2713,6 +2713,20 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
        return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
 }

+static bool audit_contid_isnesting(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+       bool isowner = false;
+       bool ownerisparent = false;
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       if (tsk->audit && tsk->audit->cont) {
+               isowner = current == tsk->audit->cont->owner;
+               ownerisparent = task_is_descendant(tsk->audit->cont->owner, current);
I want to make sure I'm understanding this correctly and I keep
mentally tripping over something: it seems like for a given audit
container ID a task is either the owner or a descendent, there is no
third state, is that correct?

Assuming that is true, can the descendent check simply be a negative
owner check given they both have the same audit container ID?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+       }
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+       return !isowner && ownerisparent;
+}
+
 /*
  * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
  * @task: target task
@@ -2755,8 +2769,13 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
                rc = -EBUSY;
                goto unlock;
        }
-       /* if contid is already set, deny */
-       if (audit_contid_set(task))
+       /* if task is not descendant, block */
+       if (task == current || !task_is_descendant(current, task)) {
I'm also still fuzzy on why we can't let a task set it's own audit
container ID, assuming it meets all the criteria established in patch
2/13.  It somewhat made sense when you were tracking inherited vs
explicitly set audit container IDs, but that doesn't appear to be the
case so far in this patchset, yes?
+               rc = -EXDEV;
I'm fairly confident we had a discussion about not using all these
different error codes, but that may be a moot point given my next
comment.
+               goto unlock;
+       }
+       /* only allow contid setting again if nesting */
+       if (audit_contid_set(task) && !audit_contid_isnesting(task))
                rc = -EEXIST;
It seems like what we need in audit_set_contid() is a check to ensure
that the task being modified is only modified by the owner of the
audit container ID, yes?  If so, I would think we could do this quite
easily with the following, or similar logic, (NOTE: assumes both
current and tsk are properly setup):

  if ((current->audit->cont != tsk->audit->cont) ||
(current->audit->cont->owner != current))
    return -EACCESS;

This is somewhat independent of the above issue, but we may also want
to add to the capability check.  Patch 2 adds a
"capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)" which is good, but perhaps we also need a
"ns_capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)" to allow a given audit container ID
orchestrator/owner the ability to control which of it's descendants
can change their audit container ID, for example:

  if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) ||
      !ns_capable(current->nsproxy->user_ns, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
    return -EPERM;

--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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