Thread (52 messages) 52 messages, 10 authors, 2020-05-17

Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Date: 2020-05-15 01:00:46
Also in: linux-fsdevel, linux-integrity, linux-security-module, lkml

On 2020/05/06 0:31, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
The goal of this patch series is to enable to control script execution
with interpreters help.  A new O_MAYEXEC flag, usable through
openat2(2), is added to enable userspace script interpreter to delegate
to the kernel (and thus the system security policy) the permission to
interpret/execute scripts or other files containing what can be seen as
commands.
Since TOMOYO considers that any file (even standard input which is connected
to keyboard) can provide data which can be interpreted as executable, TOMOYO
does not check traditional "execute permission". TOMOYO's execute permission
serves as a gate for replacing current process with a new file using execve()
syscall. All other calls (e.g. uselib(), open()) are simply treated as
opening a file for read/write/append etc. Therefore,

On 14/05/2020 18:10, Stephen Smalley wrote:> Just do both in build_open_flags() and be done with it? Looks like he
was already setting FMODE_EXEC in patch 1 so we just need to teach> AppArmor/TOMOYO to check for it and perform file execute checking in> that case if !current->in_execve?
regarding TOMOYO, I don't think that TOMOYO needs to perform file execute
checking if !current->in_execve , even if O_MAYEXEC is introduced.
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