On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 12:44 AM Sargun Dhillon [off-list ref] wrote:
PTRACE_GETFD is a generic ptrace API that allows the tracer to
get file descriptors from the traceee.
typo: tracee
The primary reason to use this syscall is to allow sandboxers to
take action on an FD on behalf of the tracee. For example, this
can be combined with seccomp's user notification feature to extract
a file descriptor and call privileged syscalls, like binding
a socket to a privileged port.
[...]
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+/* This gets a file descriptor from a running process. It doesn't require the
+ * process to be stopped.
+ */
+#define PTRACE_GETFD 0x420f
[...]
+static int ptrace_getfd(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long fd)
I'd make the "fd" parameter of this function an "unsigned int", given
that that's also the argument type of fcheck_files().
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+{
+ struct files_struct *files;
+ struct file *file;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ files = get_files_struct(child);
+ if (!files)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
+ if (!file)
+ ret = -EBADF;
+ else
+ get_file(file);
+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+ put_files_struct(files);
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
You're hardcoding the flags for the fd as 0, which means that there is
no way for the caller to enable O_CLOEXEC on the fd in a way that is
race-free against a concurrent execve(). If you can't easily plumb
through an O_CLOEXEC flag from userspace to here, you should probably
hardcode O_CLOEXEC here.
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+ if (ret >= 0)
+ fd_install(ret, file);
+
+ fput(file);
Annoyingly, this isn't how fd_install() works. fd_install() has
slightly weird semantics and consumes the reference passed to it, so
this should be:
if (ret >= 0)
fd_install(ret, file);
else
fput(file);
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