Re: [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys

On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 12:22 AM Christian Brauner
[off-list ref] wrote:

On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 04:55:48PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:

quoted

Several items in /proc/sys need not be accessible to unprivileged
tasks. Let the system administrator change the permissions, but only
to more restrictive modes than what the sysctl tables allow.

Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <redacted>
---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index d80989b6c344..88c4ca7d2782 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c

@@ -818,6 +818,10 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int

mask)
        if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
                return -EACCES;

+       error = generic_permission(inode, mask);
+       if (error)
+               return error;

In kernel/ucount.c, the ->permissions handler set_permissions() grants
access based on whether the caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. And in
net/sysctl_net.c, the handler net_ctl_permissions() grants access
based on whether the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN. This added check is
going to break those, right?