Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP_BPF
From: Alexei Starovoitov <hidden>
Date: 2019-10-02 17:19:32
Also in:
bpf, linux-security-module, netdev
On 10/1/19 3:47 PM, Steven Rostedt wrote:
On Tue, 1 Oct 2019 22:18:18 +0000 Alexei Starovoitov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
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And then you can just format the string from the bpf_trace_printk() into msg, and then have: trace_bpf_print(msg);It's an interesting idea, but I don't think it can work. Please see bpf_trace_printk implementation in kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c It's a lot more than string printing.Well, trace_printk() is just string printing. I was thinking that the bpf_trace_printk() could just use a vsnprintf() into a temporary buffer (like trace_printk() does), and then call the trace event to write it out.
are you proposing to replicate get_trace_buf() functionality into bpf_trace_printk? So print into temp string buffer is done twice? I'm not excited about such hack. And what's the goal? so that trace_bpf_print(string_msg); can go through _run-time_ check whether that particular trace event was allowed in tracefs ? That's not how file system acls are typically designed. The permission check is at open(). Not at write(). If I understood you correctly you're proposing to check permissions at bpf program run-time which is no good. bpf_trace_printk() already has one small buffer for probe_kernel_read-ing an unknown string to pass into %s. That's not ftrace. That's core tracing. That aspect is covered by CAP_TRACING as well.
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The user could then just enable the trace event from the file system. I could also work on making instances work like /tmp does (with the sticky bit) in creation. That way people with write access to the instances directory, can make their own buffers that they can use (and others can't access).We tried instances in bcc in the past and eventually removed all the support. The overhead of instances is too high to be usable.What overhead? An ftrace instance should not have any more overhead than the root one does (it's the same code). Or are you talking about memory overhead?
Yes. Memory overhead. Human users doing cat/echo into tracefs won't be creating many instances, so that's the only practical usage of them.
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Both 'trace' and 'trace_pipe' have quirky side effects. Like opening 'trace' file will make all parallel trace_printk() to be ignored. While reading 'trace_pipe' file will clear it. The point that traditional 'read' and 'write' ACLs don't map as-is to tracefs, so I would be careful categorizing things into confidentiality vs integrity only based on access type.What exactly is the bpf_trace_printk() used for? I may have other ideas that can help.It's debugging of bpf programs. Same is what printk() is used for by kernel developers.How is it extracted? Just read from the trace or trace_pipe file?
yep. Just like kernel devs look at dmesg when they sprinkle printk. btw, if you can fix 'trace' file issue that stops all trace_printk while 'trace' file is open that would be great. Some users have been bitten by this behavior. We even documented it.