Re: [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 9:31 AM David Howells [off-list ref] wrote:

Matthew Garrett [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

 enum lockdown_reason {
      LOCKDOWN_NONE,
+     LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
      LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
      LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };

Aren't you mixing disjoint sets?

The goal is to be able to check whether any given lockdown reason is a
matter of integrity or confidentiality in a straightforward way.

quoted

+     [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",

Wouldn't it be better to pass this string as a parameter to
security_locked_down()?

I thought about that, but it's not how any other LSM hooks behave. I
think it's probably easier to revisit that when we see how other LSMs
want to make use of the data.