Re: [PATCH V37 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
From: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Date: 2019-08-13 06:11:01
Also in:
linux-security-module, lkml
Hi On 2019-08-01 00:16, Matthew Garrett wrote:
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing open(). Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <redacted> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
This patch causes the following regression on various Samsung Exynos SoC based boards (ARM 32bit): [ 15.364422] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 15.368775] pgd = a530ddbe [ 15.371447] [00000000] *pgd=bcd7c831 [ 15.374993] Internal error: Oops: 80000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 15.380890] Modules linked in: [ 15.383929] CPU: 0 PID: 1393 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.2.0-00027-g757ff7244358-dirty #6459 [ 15.392086] Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [ 15.398164] PC is at 0x0 [ 15.400687] LR is at do_dentry_open+0x22c/0x3b0 [ 15.405193] pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<c02977c4>] psr: 60000053 [ 15.411442] sp : e7317dd8 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000000 [ 15.416650] r10: c0187e6c r9 : c041f8cc r8 : e72123c8 [ 15.421858] r7 : e7317ec0 r6 : e7d89630 r5 : 00000000 r4 : e72123c0 [ 15.428368] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 5ba370f3 r1 : e72123c0 r0 : e7d89630 [ 15.434880] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none [ 15.442083] Control: 10c5387d Table: 6726404a DAC: 00000051 [ 15.447812] Process perf (pid: 1393, stack limit = 0x17621431) [ 15.453628] Stack: (0xe7317dd8 to 0xe7318000) ... [ 15.604842] [<c02977c4>] (do_dentry_open) from [<c02aafc8>] (path_openat+0x5a0/0x1004) [ 15.612735] [<c02aafc8>] (path_openat) from [<c02acce8>] (do_filp_open+0x6c/0xd8) [ 15.620200] [<c02acce8>] (do_filp_open) from [<c0298cc4>] (do_sys_open+0x130/0x1f4) [ 15.627839] [<c0298cc4>] (do_sys_open) from [<c0101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28) [ 15.635560] Exception stack(0xe7317fa8 to 0xe7317ff0) [ 15.640596] 7fa0: 0022dc0b 001deee0 ffffff9c beb6d764 00020000 00000000 [ 15.648756] 7fc0: 0022dc0b 001deee0 0022dba8 00000142 001ba044 00241d68 001a13d8 beb6e78c [ 15.656913] 7fe0: b6f7e000 beb6c6f8 9a27c600 b6f69504 [ 15.661952] Code: bad PC value [ 15.665105] ---[ end trace 7e8b864582108f4a ]--- This is standard ARM 32bit kernel with arch/arm/configs/exynos_defconfig. It is enough to run "perf list" command.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
--- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index 1387bcd96a79..12a325fb4cbd 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE 0700@@ -28,6 +29,23 @@ static struct vfsmount *tracefs_mount; static int tracefs_mount_count; static bool tracefs_registered; +static int default_open_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry; + struct file_operations *real_fops; + int ret; + + if (!dentry) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS); + if (ret) + return ret; + + real_fops = dentry->d_fsdata;
real_fops are NULL in my test case.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ return real_fops->open(inode, filp); +} + static ssize_t default_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) {@@ -210,6 +228,12 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb) return 0; } +static void tracefs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + kfree(inode->i_fop); +} + static int tracefs_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc) { struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;@@ -236,6 +260,7 @@ static int tracefs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = { .statfs = simple_statfs, + .destroy_inode = tracefs_destroy_inode, .show_options = tracefs_show_options, };@@ -372,6 +397,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct dentry *parent, void *data, const struct file_operations *fops) { + struct file_operations *proxy_fops; struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *inode;@@ -387,8 +413,20 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, if (unlikely(!inode)) return failed_creating(dentry); + proxy_fops = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_operations), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!proxy_fops)) { + iput(inode); + return failed_creating(dentry); + } + + if (!fops) + fops = &tracefs_file_operations; + + dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops; + memcpy(proxy_fops, fops, sizeof(*proxy_fops)); + proxy_fops->open = default_open_file; inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations; + inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; inode->i_private = data; d_instantiate(dentry, inode); fsnotify_create(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index d92323b44a3f..807dc0d24982 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ, LOCKDOWN_PERF, + LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index 88064ce1c844..173191562047 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", + [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Best regards -- Marek Szyprowski, PhD Samsung R&D Institute Poland