Thread (80 messages) 80 messages, 17 authors, 2019-07-11

Re: [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

From: Matthew Garrett <hidden>
Date: 2019-06-24 21:31:01
Also in: bpf, linux-security-module, lkml, netdev

On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 2:22 PM Daniel Borkmann [off-list ref] wrote:
Agree, for example, bpf_probe_write_user() can never write into
kernel memory (only user one). Just thinking out loud, wouldn't it
be cleaner and more generic to perform this check at the actual function
which performs the kernel memory without faulting? All three of these
are in mm/maccess.c, and the very few occasions that override the
probe_kernel_read symbol are calling eventually into __probe_kernel_read(),
so this would catch all of them wrt lockdown restrictions. Otherwise
you'd need to keep tracking every bit of new code being merged that
calls into one of these, no? That way you only need to do it once like
below and are guaranteed that the check catches these in future as well.
Not all paths into probe_kernel_read/write are from entry points that
need to be locked down (eg, as far as I can tell ftrace can't leak
anything interesting here).
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