Re: [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Date: 2019-06-24 21:27:49
Also in:
kexec, linux-security-module, lkml
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Date: 2019-06-24 21:27:49
Also in:
kexec, linux-security-module, lkml
Hi Matthew, On Mon, 2019-06-24 at 14:06 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 6:52 PM Dave Young [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 06/21/19 at 01:18pm, Matthew Garrett wrote:quoted
I don't think so - we want it to be possible to load images if they have a valid signature.I know it works like this way because of the previous patch. But from the patch log "When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images", it is simple to check it early for !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down(reason, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY) instead of depending on the late code to verify signature. In that way, easier to understand the logic, no?But that combination doesn't enforce signature validation? We can't depend on !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE) because then it'll enforce signature validation even if lockdown is disabled.
I agree with Dave. There should be a stub lockdown function to prevent enforcing lockdown when it isn't enabled. Mimi