Thread (30 messages) 30 messages, 6 authors, 2019-06-05

Rational model for UID based controls

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: 2019-06-05 16:57:03
Also in: keyrings, linux-block, linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, lkml

Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:
YES!
I'm trying to decide if that's fervour or irritation at this point ;-)
And it would be really great if you put some thought into what
a rational model would be for UID based controls, too.
I have put some thought into it, but I don't see a single rational model.  It
depends very much on the situation.

In any case, that's what I was referring to when I said I might need to call
inode_permission().  But UIDs don't exist for all filesystems, for example,
and there are no UIDs on superblocks, mount objects or hardware events.

Now, I could see that you ignore UIDs on things like keys and
hardware-triggered events, but how does this interact with things like mount
watches that see directories that have UIDs?

Are you advocating making it such that process B can only see events triggered
by process A if they have the same UID, for example?

David
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