On May 12, 2019 5:02:30 PM PDT, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
On Sun, 2019-05-12 at 17:31 +0200, Dominik Brodowski wrote:
quoted
On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 08:52:47AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
quoted
quoted
It's too late. The /init itself should be signed and verified.
Could you elaborate a bit more about the threat model, and why
deferring
quoted
this to the initramfs is too late?
The IMA policy defines a number of different methods of identifying
which files to measure, appraise, audit.[1] Without xattrs, the
granularity of the policy rules is severely limited. Without xattrs,
a filesystem is either in policy, or not.
With an IMA policy rule requiring rootfs (tmpfs) files to be verified,
then /init needs to be properly labeled, otherwise /init will fail to
execute.
Mimi
[1] Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
And the question is what is the sense in that, especially if /init is provided as play of the kernel itself.
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