Re: [PATCH] mm/mincore: allow for making sys_mincore() privileged
From: Vlastimil Babka <hidden>
Date: 2019-01-05 19:15:04
Also in:
linux-mm, lkml
On 5.1.2019 18:27, Jiri Kosina wrote:
From: Jiri Kosina <redacted> There are possibilities [1] how mincore() could be used as a converyor of a sidechannel information about pagecache metadata. Provide vm.mincore_privileged sysctl, which makes it possible to mincore() start returning -EPERM in case it's invoked by a process lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Haven't checked the details yet, but wouldn't it be safe if anonymous private mincore() kept working, and restrictions were applied only to page cache?
The default behavior stays "mincore() can be used by anybody" in order to be conservative with respect to userspace behavior.
What if we lied instead of returned -EPERM, to not break userspace so obviously? I guess false positive would be the safer lie?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
[1] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/01/05/boffins_beat_page_cache/ Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <redacted> --- Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 9 +++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 8 ++++++++ mm/mincore.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt index 187ce4f599a2..afb8635e925e 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/vm: - min_free_kbytes - min_slab_ratio - min_unmapped_ratio +- mincore_privileged - mmap_min_addr - mmap_rnd_bits - mmap_rnd_compat_bits@@ -485,6 +486,14 @@ files and similar are considered. The default is 1 percent. ============================================================== +mincore_privileged: + +mincore() could be potentially used to mount a side-channel attack against +pagecache metadata. This sysctl provides system administrators means to +make it available only to processess that own CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. + +The default is 0, which means mincore() can be used without restrictions. +============================================================== mmap_min_addrdiff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 1825f712e73b..f03cb07c8dd4 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ extern unsigned int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max; #ifndef CONFIG_MMU extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; #endif +extern int sysctl_mincore_privileged; /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR@@ -1684,6 +1685,13 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max, }, #endif + { + .procname = "mincore_privileged", + .data = &sysctl_mincore_privileged, + .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_mincore_privileged), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, { } };diff --git a/mm/mincore.c b/mm/mincore.c index 218099b5ed31..77d4928cdfaa 100644 --- a/mm/mincore.c +++ b/mm/mincore.c@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> +int sysctl_mincore_privileged; + static int mincore_hugetlb(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk) {@@ -228,6 +230,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mincore, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long pages; unsigned char *tmp; + if (sysctl_mincore_privileged && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + /* Check the start address: needs to be page-aligned.. */ if (start & ~PAGE_MASK) return -EINVAL;