On 07/23/2018 01:55 PM, Michael Tirado wrote:

Hey, I'm not seeing much activity on this so here's my $0.02

quoted

Unix socket automatically translates pid attached to SCM_CREDENTIALS.
This requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN for sending arbitrary pids and entering
into pid namespace, this expose process and could be insecure.

Perhaps it would be a good idea to add a sysctl switch that prevents
credential spoofing over AF_UNIX \by default\ if that is the main
concern, or is there another concern and I have read this wrong?  I'm
having trouble thinking of a legitimate use of SCM_CREDENTIALS
spoofing that isn't in a debugging or troubleshooting context and
would be more comfortable if it were not possible at all... Anyone
know of a program that relies on this spoofing functionality?

If you look at socket(7) under SO_PEERCRED there is a way to get
credentials at time of connect() for an AF_UNIX SOCK_STREAM, or at
time of socketpair() for a SOCK_DGRAM. I would like to think these
credentials are reliable, but will probably require some extra daemon
to proxy a dgram syslog socket.

Thanks for the comments Michael! The usecase we are considering involves 
non root monitor process be able to translate the process ID of other 
non-root processes under same user within nested PID namespaces. With 
SCM_CREDENTIALS method, we require open sockets and connections between 
the processes which require PID translation and also CAP_SYS_ADMIN which 
is higher than required privilege level for non-root monitor process. 
The current patch solves this problem by enabling to open the related 
procfs fd when required during PID translation. I believe almost 
everyone agreed on this V6 patch but not sure why it is in limbo still.

Thanks,
Nagarathnam.