On Thu 2018-04-19 15:38:53, David Howells wrote:

Pavel Machek [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

quoted

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
kernel is locked down.

I'd rather see hibernation fixed than disabled like this.

The problem is that you have to store the hibernated kernel image encrypted,
but you can't store the decryption key on disk unencrypted or you've just
wasted the effort.

That's not how the crypto needs to work. Talk to Jiri Kosina, ok?

Firmware gives you a key, you keep it secret, use it to sign the
hibernation image on suspend, and verify the signature on resume. Or
something like that.

									Pavel
-- 
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