On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Serge E. Hallyn [off-list ref] wrote:
Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) (maheshb-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org):
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diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fc46f5b85251..89103f16ac37 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
{
struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
+ /* If the capability is controlled and user-ns that process
+ * belongs-to is 'controlled' then return EPERM and no need
+ * to check the user-ns hierarchy.
+ */
+ if (is_user_ns_controlled(cred->user_ns) &&
+ is_capability_controlled(cap))
+ return -EPERM;
I'd be curious to see the performance impact on this on a regular
workload (kernel build?) in a controlled ns.
Should it affect? If at all, it should be +ve since, the recursive
user-ns hierarchy lookup is avoided with the above check if the
capability is controlled.
Yes but I expect that to be the rare case for normal lxc installs
(which are of course what I am interested in)
quoted
The additional cost otherwise is this check
per cap_capable() call.
And pipeline refetching?
Capability calls also shouldn't be all that frequent, but still I'm
left wondering...
Correct, and capability checks are part of the control-path and not
the data-path so shouldn't matter but I guess it doesn't hurt to
find-out the number. Do you have any workload in mind, that we can use
for this test/benchmark?