Thread (2 messages) 2 messages, 2 authors, 2017-10-19

Re: RFC(v2): Audit Kernel Container IDs

From: Eric W. Biederman <hidden>
Date: 2017-10-19 00:43:25
Also in: cgroups, linux-fsdevel, lkml, netdev

Possibly related (same subject, not in this thread)

Aleksa Sarai [off-list ref] writes:
quoted
quoted
The security implications are that anything that can change the label
could also hide itself and its doings from the audit system and thus
would be used as a means to evade detection.  I actually think this
means the label should be write once (once you've set it, you can't
change it) ...
Richard and I have talked about a write once approach, but the
thinking was that you may want to allow a nested container
orchestrator (Why? I don't know, but people always want to do the
craziest things.) and a write-once policy makes that impossible.  If
we punt on the nested orchestrator, I believe we can seriously think
about a write-once policy to simplify things.
Nested containers are a very widely used use-case (see LXC system containers,
inside of which people run other container runtimes). So I would definitely
consider it something that "needs to be supported in some way". While the LXC
guys might be a *tad* crazy, the use-case isn't. :P
Of course some of that gets to running auditd inside a container which
we don't have yet either.

So I think to start it is perfectly fine to figure out the non-nested
case first and what makes sense there.  Then to sort out the nested
container case.

The solution might be that a process gets at most one id per ``audit
namespace''.

Eric
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