Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
From: Serge E. Hallyn <hidden>
Date: 2017-06-02 18:18:19
Also in:
linux-security-module, lkml
From: Serge E. Hallyn <hidden>
Date: 2017-06-02 18:18:19
Also in:
linux-security-module, lkml
Quoting Matt Brown (matt-YiBOUZGZpYMAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
On 6/2/17 12:57 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:quoted
I'm not quite sure what you're asking for here. Let me offer a precise strawman design. I'm sure there are problems with it, it's just a starting point. system-wide whitelist (for now 'may_push_chars') is full by default.So is may_push_chars just an alias for TIOCSTI? Or are there some potential whitelist members that would map to multiple ioctls?
<shrug> I'm seeing it as only TIOCSTI right now.
quoted
By default, nothing changes - you can use those on your own tty, need CAP_SYS_ADMIN against init_user_ns otherwise. Introduce a new CAP_TTY_PRIVILEGED.I'm fine with this.quoted
When may_push_chars is removed from the whitelist, you lose the ability to use TIOCSTI on a tty - even your own - if you do not have CAP_TTY_PRIVILEGED against the tty's user_ns.How do you propose storing/updating the whitelist? sysctl? If it is a sysctl, would each whitelist member have a sysctl? e.g.: kernel.ioctlwhitelist.may_push_chars = 1 Overall, I'm fine with this idea.
That sounds reasonable. Or a securityfs file - I guess not everyone has securityfs, but if it were to become part of YAMA then that would work. -serge