Thread (38 messages) 38 messages, 9 authors, 2017-05-05

Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction

From: Djalal Harouni <hidden>
Date: 2017-04-22 01:19:59
Also in: linux-security-module, lkml

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 2:12 AM, Djalal Harouni [off-list ref] wrote:
On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 1:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote:
[...]
quoted
quoted
quoted
I personally like my implicit_rights idea, and it might be interesting
to prototype it.
I don't like blocking a needed feature behind a large super-feature
that doesn't exist yet. We'd be able to refactor this code into using
such a thing in the future, so I'd prefer to move ahead with this
since it would stop actual exploits.
I don't think the super-feature is so hard, and I think we should not
add the per-task thing the way it's done in this patch.  Let's not add
per-task things where the best argument for their security is "not
sure how it would be exploited".
Actually the XFRM framework CVE-2017-7184 [1] is one real example, of
course there are others. The exploit was used on a generic distro
during a security contest that distro is Ubuntu. That distro will
never provide a module autoloading restriction by default to not harm
it's users. Consumers or containers/sandboxes then can run their
confined apps using such facilities.

These bugs will stay in embedded devices that use these generic
distros for ever.
The DCCP CVE-2017-6074 exploit:
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/503

Well, pretty sure there is more... the bugs are real, as their
exploits. Anyway I think these features can coexist as they are
optional, and most process trees protections can get along by design.


-- 
tixxdz
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help